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Abstract
This article explores the ways in which Zhou Zuoren critiqued violence in modern China as a belief-‐‑driven
phenomenon. Differing from Lu Xun and other mainstream intellectuals, Zhou consistently denied the
legitimacy of violence as a force for modernizing China. Relying on extensive readings in anthropology,
intellectual history, and religious studies, he investigated the fundamental “nexus” between violence and the
religious, political, and ideological beliefs. In the Enlightenment’s effort to achieve modernity, cannibalistic
Confucianism was to be cleansed from the corpus of Chinese culture as the “barbaric” cultural Other, but
Zhou was convinced that such barbaric cannibalism was inherited by the Enlightenment thinkers, and thus
made the Enlightenment impossible. Through critiquing the violence in intellectual persecution and everyday
life, and through identifying modern intellectuals and the masses as the major sponsors and agents of
violence, Zhou questioned the legitimacy of the mainstream Enlightenment, modern political movements,
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Iowa  State  University  
 
This  article  explores   the  ways   in  which  Zhou  Zuoren  critiqued  violence   in  modern  
China  as  a  belief-­‐‑driven  phenomenon.  Differing  from  Lu  Xun  and  other  mainstream  
intellectuals,   Zhou   consistently   denied   the   legitimacy   of   violence   as   a   force   for  
modernizing   China.   Relying   on   extensive   readings   in   anthropology,   intellectual  
history,   and   religious   studies,   he   investigated   the   fundamental   “nexus”   between  
violence  and   the   religious,  political,   and   ideological  beliefs.   In   the  Enlightenment’s  
effort  to  achieve  modernity,  cannibalistic  Confucianism  was  to  be  cleansed  from  the  
corpus  of  Chinese  culture  as  the  “barbaric”  cultural  Other,  but  Zhou  was  convinced  
that   such   barbaric   cannibalism   was   inherited   by   the   Enlightenment   thinkers,   and  
thus   made   the   Enlightenment   impossible.   Through   critiquing   the   violence   in  
intellectual   persecution   and   everyday   life,   and   through   identifying   modern  
intellectuals   and   the   masses   as   the   major   sponsors   and   agents   of   violence,   Zhou  
questioned   the   legitimacy   of   the   mainstream   Enlightenment,   modern   political  
movements,   and   national   salvation   by   defining   them   as   inherently   irrational   and  
violent.      
  
To  kill  a  man  is  not  to  protect  a  doctrine,  but  it  is  to  kill  a  man.  




When   it   comes   to   violence,   the   contrast   between   wide   practice   and   limited  
research  is  undeniable.  In  On  Violence,  Hannah  Arendt  notes  that,  although  it  plays  an  
enormous   role   in  human  affairs,   violence   and   its   arbitrariness  have  been   “taken   for  
granted,”  and,   following  Hobbes,   she  attributes   the  phenomenon   to  human  nature.1  
The   same   can   be   said   about   the   attitude   towards   violence   in   China.   In   discussing  
violence   in   elite   culture,   Barend   J.   ter   Haar  writes   that   violence   in   Chinese   culture  
“has   hardly   been   studied   in   a   systematic   way.”2  Andrew   F.   Jones   makes   a   similar  
 
1  Hannah  Arendt,  On  Violence  (San  Diego:  HBJ,  1970),  8.  
2  Barend  J.  ter  Haar,  “Rethinking  ‘Violence’  in  Chinese  Culture,”  in  Meanings  of  Violence:  a  Cross  
Cultural  Perspective,  eds.  Göran  Aijmer,  and  Jos  Abbink  (Oxford:  Berg,  2000),  123.  
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observation   in   his   discussion   of   Shi   Zhicun  施蛰存   (1905-­‐‑2003)   and   Yu   Hua  余华  
(1960-­‐‑   ).3  Arendt’s  explanation  aside,   it  might  also  be  the  case  that,  as  a  means  to  an  
end,   violence   is   effective   in   practical   terms   and   is   therefore   justified   as   necessary,  
especially   in   the   resistance   to   injustice.4  Any   criticism   of   violence   or   advocacy   of  
nonviolence   is   easily   dismissed   as   socially   unrealistic   and   politically   naïve.5  Critical  
response  to  the  work  of  Zhou  Zuoren  周作人  (1885-­‐‑1967)  is  a  case  in  point.  This  study  
will  demonstrate  how  his  critique  of  violence6  was  marginalized   in   the  discourse  on  
the  Chinese  Enlightenment  that  began  with  the  May  Fourth  movement.7  
Differing   from   Lu   Xun   鲁迅   (1881-­‐‑1936),   who   seldom   questioned   the   use   of  
violence  in  resistance,  Zhou  Zuoren  consistently  denied  the  legitimacy  of  violence  as  a  
force   for   modernizing   China.   According   to   Zhou,   Lu   Xun   always   insisted   on  
answering  hostility  with  more  hostility:   “If   someone   stares   at   him,  he  will   get   even  
with  cursing;  if  someone  curses  him,  he  will  repay  it  with  a  beating;  if  someone  beats  
him,   he   will   kill   that   person.   He   has   such   a   harsh   proposal,   and   such   a   great  
attitude.”8  Ironically,   Zhou’s   sarcastic   kudos   from   the   1960s   could   be   read   as   a  
compliment,   since   Lu   Xun’s   uncompromising   attitude   has   been   valued   in   the  
mainstream.   From   the   outset,   Zhou   stressed   that   violence   was   not   suitable   for  
promoting   social   progress   in   China’s   historical   context.   Rather,   he   sought   social  
change   and   intellectual   engagement   through   nonviolence.   He   might   have   received  
influence   from   Christianity   and   the   work   of   Tolstoy   in   formulating   such   ideas.9  In  
1918,   it   led   him   to   the   “New   Village   Movement,” a   utopian   socialist   movement  
 
3  Andrew  Jones,  “The  Violence  of  the  Text:  Reading  Yu  Hua  and  Shi  Zhicun,”  positions  2:  no.3  
(1994):  570-­‐‑602.  
4  Robert  Audi,  “Preliminary  theoretical  considerations  concerning  the  justification  of  violence,”  
in   Violence   in   Modern   Literature,   eds.   James   A.   Gould,   and   John   J.   Iorio   (SF:   Boyd   &   Fraser  
Publishing,1972),  66.  
5  For  example,  it  is  not  until  recently  that  Mahatma  Gandhi'ʹs  thoughts  “officially”  entered  into  
China   with   the   translation   of  Gandhi'ʹs   Outstanding   Leadership   by   Pascal   Alan   Nazareth.   See  
Shang  Quanyu,  甘地:  杰出的领袖  (Beijing:  Shangwu  yinshuguan,  2012)  for  the  Chinese  version.  
6  While  there  are  numerous  definitions  of  violence,  in  this  article  I  will  define  it  broadly,  based  
on  Zhou’s  use  of  the  term,  as  the  intense  force  inflicted  on  human  beings  to  cause  physiological,  
psychological,   or   symbolic   damage   for   maintaining   or   subverting   power   relationships  
(domination,  ideology,  etc.).  
7  Although  David  Der-­‐‑wei  Wang  and  others  have  pushed  the  beginning  of  Chinese  modernity  
to   the   Late   Qing   period,   I   will   still   define   the   mainstream   Chinese   Enlightenment   as   an  
intellectual  movement  from  1917  to  1927.        
8  Zhou  Zuoren,  Memoir  of  Zhou  Zuoren  知堂回想录  (HK:  San  Yu  Publishing,  1980),  425.  
9  Kōbai   Inoue,   “An   Interview  with  Zhou  Zuoren”  采访周作人,  A  Retrospection  of  Zhou  Zuoren:  
Literature   Review   回望周作人 :   研究述评 ,   trans.   Dong   Bingyue   (Zhengzhou:   Henan   daxue  
chubanshe,  2004),  29;  Ozaki  Fumiaki,  “The  Zhou  Zuoren  Who  Parted  Ways  with  Chen  Duxiu”  
与陈独秀分道扬镳的周作人,  A  Retrospection  of  Zhou  Zuoren:  Literature  Review,  trans.  Li  Guangmo,  
46;   Ha   Yingfei,   Half   Confucian,   Half   Buddhist   半是儒家半释家    (Beijing:   Renmin   wenxue  
chubanshe,  2007),  16-­‐‑66.  
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founded   in   Japan   by   Saneatsu   Mushanokōji   (1885-­‐‑1976).10  By   1919,   Zhou   further  
argued   that   violence  had   to  be   avoided  because  of   its  potential   to  destroy  a   society  
and  contaminate  the  intellectual  atmosphere.  Taking  China’s  reality  and  history  into  
consideration,   he   deemed   it   dangerous   to   resort   to   violent   measures   in   social   and  
political  reforms,  and  regarded  revolution  as  “unnecessary  demolition.”  Any  person  
who  aspired  to  live  a  “model  human  life”  had  to  rely  on  reason  rather  than  violence.11  
Driven  by  his  wish  to  preserve  and  nurture  human  life,  he  tirelessly  maintained  that  
“violence  is  not  a  choice”—no  matter  how  legitimate  an  end  it  might  serve. 12    Zhou’s  
denial,  in  the  late  1910s,  of  both  the  legitimacy  of  violence  in  general  and  revolution  in  
particular  prefigured  his  disagreement  with  the  mainstream  practices  of  his  time.  To  
him,  the  only  meaningful  form  of  resistance,  as  he  proposed  in  1922,  was  “resistance  
with   reason.”13  However,   he   eventually   abandoned  his  utopian  dreams  and  became  
disillusioned  with  the  increasingly  violent  tendencies  that  grew  out  of  the  idealism  of  
the  May  Fourth  movement.  
Zhou  eventually  admitted  that  violence  was  part  of   the  human  condition.  As  he  
wrote   in  1926,   class   struggle  was  not  a  Marxist   invention  but  an  undeniable   fact,   as  
true   as   the   Darwinian   idea   of   competition   for   survival.14  In   1931,   he   repeated   that  
human  beings  were  organisms  and  that   the  principles  of  organic   life  also  applied  to  
humankind.   In   harsh   competition,   only   the   fittest   survived   and   only   force   could  
answer   force.   To   explain   this   cruel   reality,   he   borrowed  Wu  Zhihui’s  吴稚晖   (1865-­‐‑
1953)  words:  “One  shoots  you  with  a  machine  gun  and  you  return  fire  with  a  machine  
gun.” 15  Ironically   enough,   his   faith   in   Darwinism   did   not   convince   him   of   the  
ultimately   progressive   direction   of   social   development,   but   rather   reinforced   his  
pessimism  about   the  cost  of   this  development.  The  1927  “White  Terror”  perpetrated  
by   Chiang   Kai-­‐‑shek   蒋介石    (1887-­‐‑1975)   convinced   him   that   “nonviolence”   was  
impracticable.  He  transformed  his  previous  proposal  of  “resistance  with  reason”  into  
a  purely  epistemological  activity.  This  choice  further  detached  him  from  mainstream  
social  movements,  leading  him  to  observe  and  meditate  upon  their  violent  nature  in  a  
highly   artistic  way.16  The   tensions  between  his   lighthearted   style   and   his  disturbing  
subject  matter  helped  create  a  sophisticated  critical  space―one  which  deserves  more  
 
10 For  a  detailed  account  of  Zhou’s  participation  in  the  movement,  see  Qian  Liqun,  Biography  of  
Zhou  Zuoren  周作人传  (Beijing:  Shiyue  wenyi  chubanshe,  1990),  223-­‐‑34.    
11  Zhou  Zuoren,  “New  Village  in  Japan”  日本的新村,  Collected  Essays  of  Zhou  Zuoren  周作人散文
全集 vol.2,  ed.  Zhong  Shuhe  (Guilin:  Guangxi  shifan  daxue  chubanshe,  2009),  136,  141.    
12  Zhou,  “A  Visit  to  New  Village  in  Japan”  访日本新村记,  Collected  Essays  vol.2,  181.  
13  Zhou,  “The  Centennial  of  Friedrich  Schiller”  诗人席烈的百年忌,  Collected  Essays  vol.2,  707.  
14  Zhou,  “An  Amateur’s  Comments”外行的按语,  Collected  Essays  vol.4,  512.  
15  Zhou,  “On  Enlisting  Soldiers”  关于征兵,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  792.    
16  Zhou’s  artistic  achievements  have  been  widely  recognized,  and  although  self-­‐‑portrayed  as  a  
hermit,  in  the  1930s  he  became  the  spiritual  leader  of  the  influential  Peking  School  京派,  which  
included  such  important  writers  as  Sheng  Congwen沈从文  (1902-­‐‑1988),  Xiao  Qian  萧乾  (1910-­‐‑
1999),  Zhu  Guangqian  朱光潜  (1897-­‐‑1986),  and  Yu  Pingbo俞平伯  (1900-­‐‑1990).    
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scholarly  attention  than  it  has  received.  His  case  shows  how  a  critique  of  violence  is  
eventually   silenced   in   the   dominant   discourses   of   social   progress,   communist  
revolution  and  national  salvation.  
            In  his  numerous  writings  on  violence,  Zhou  was   continually  pulled   between  his  
universalist   ideals   and   his   awareness   of   the   contingent   political   reality   in  which   he  
lived.   For   example,   he   seldom   stayed  within   the  discourse   on   the  Chinese   national  
character  but  consistently  regarded  its  negative  traits  as  universal  human  defects.  He  
strove   to  explain   these  defects  by  attributing   them  to  such   factors  as  human  nature,  
reason,   individuality,   gender   and   sexuality,   revolution,   belief   and   violence,   among  
others.  Approaching   the   “Chinese”  problems  as  universal   from  a  philosophical   and  
anthropological  perspective,  he  de-­‐‑essentialized  the  concept  of  “China”  and  made  it  a  
placeholder   he   could   use   to   examine   human   complexity.   In   a   politically   charged  
milieu,  these  examinations  distinguished  him  as  a  thinker,  even  as  they  failed  to  reach  
his   contemporaries.   As   he   could   not   establish   effective   dialogues   with   his   fellow  
intellectuals,   they   came   to   perceive   him   as   a   modern   hermit   terrified   by   bloody  
realities.  His  apparent  detachment   led   them  to  dismiss  his  works  as   irrelevant,  with  
the   writer   Lu   Xun   deriding   them   as   “trinkets.”   His   critique   of   violence   thus   often  
ended   as   a   monologue.   Such   a   failure   revealed   the   incompatibility   between   his  
individualistic,   rationalistic   and   universalist   thinking   on   the   one   hand   and   the  
dominant   discourses   celebrating   the   collective,   the   political   and   the   national   on   the  
other.    
Read   as   a   whole,   Zhou’s   critique   of   violence   formed   an   alternative   to   the  
mainstream  conceptualization  of  violence.  It  also  formed  an  indispensable  dimension  
in   his   reflection   on   the   limits   of   the   Enlightenment   project.   As   I   have   argued  
elsewhere,   Zhou   intended   to   carry   out   his   own   enlightenment   project,   focusing   on  
gradual   diffusion   of   reason   and   modern   knowledge   while   refusing   ideologically  
driven  mainstream  practices.17  Here  I  further  argue  that,  in  Zhou’s  critique  of  Chinese  
modernity,   if   belief   framed   the   epistemological   foundation   of   the   mainstream  
Enlightenment  project  and  the  consequent  political  movements,  violence  constituted  
the   mode   of   practice   for   those   movements.   Zhou   proposed   resisting   such   violence  
with   reason,   but   this   proposal   was   met   with   silence.   As   though   his   being   ignored  
were  not  enough,  he  was  also  made  a  sacrificial  lamb.    
In   Zhou’s   rationale,   belief   formed   what   Andrew   Murphy   calls   a   “nexus,”18  a  
“reciprocal”   relationship   with   violence:   Violence   became   instrumental   as   well   as  
essential   to   the   practices   of   sustaining   or   demolishing   the   prevailing   religious,  
political,  and  ideological  beliefs,  which,  in  return,  popularized  and  sanctified  the  use  
of  violence.  If  uncritical  belief  was  what  Zhou  criticized  as  the  end,  violence  was  the  
practical  means  to  such  an  end.    
 
17  Tonglu   Li,   “To   Believe   or   Not   to   Believe:   Zhou   Zuoren'ʹs   Alternative   Approaches   to   the  
Chinese  Enlightenment,”  Modern  Chinese  Literature  and  Culture,  25.1  (2013):  206-­‐‑60.  
18  Andrew   Murphy,   The   Blackwell   Companion   to   Religion   and   Violence   (Hoboken,   NJ:   Wiley-­‐‑
Blackwell,  2011),  2.  
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As  a  study  to  make  sense  of  such  complexities,   this  article  will  delineate  Zhou’s  
critique  of  violence  in  the  context  of  Chinese  modernity.  It  will  focus  on  the  ways  in  
which   violence   was   legitimized   by   thinkers   in   the   intellectual   and   political  
mainstream.   It   will   also   explore   its   rationalization,   its   institutional   and   everyday  
manifestations,   its   proponents   and   agents,   and   its   influence   on   intellectual   identity.  
As   a   prolific   writer,   Zhou   developed   his   ideas   in   a   non-­‐‑systematic   fashion   with  
references  to  the  bloodstained  social  practices  of  his  time.  He  concurrently  focused  on  
issues  of  faith,  violence,  and  everyday  life.  These  themes  recur  constantly,  anchoring  
his  fragmented  writings.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  to  construct  from  them  a  mosaic  that  
illustrates  his   systematic   critique  of  violence.  As  we  will   find  out,  Zhou   shares much 
common ground with scholars today, who continue his project by dissecting the cultural 
hegemony that formed the core of Chinese modernity. 
  
Cannibalism  and  the  Nexus  of  Belief  and  Violence    
  
Zhou  Zuoren  endeavored   to  explore   the   fundamental  “nexus”  between  violence  
and   the   religious,   political,   and   ideological   beliefs   through   a   universalist   approach.  
He   relied   on   extensive   readings   in   anthropology,   intellectual   history,   and   religious  
studies   as   lenses   through  which   to  view  China’s   reality.   Several  questions  drew  his  
concern:  What  was  behind  the  intermittent  violence?  What  ultimately  drove  violence?  
How   was   violence   legitimized   and   even   sanctified   in   human   history?   While  
commenting   in   1934   on   the   persecution   of   homosexuals   by   German   Nazis,   Zhou  
ridiculed  the  extreme  act  of  book  burning  for  its  similarity  to  the  deeds  of  the  Chinese  
First   Emperor   and   the   popes   of   the  Middle  Ages.   The  parallels   not   only   served   his  
rhetorical   purposes   but   also   reflected   his   understanding   of   historical   continuity,  
which  manifested  itself  not  through  progress  but  through  the  recurrence  of  violence:    
  
In  the  past,  whenever  a  man  went  crazy,  the  savages  thought  that  he  was  possessed  
by   gods   and   issued   oracular   pronouncements   through   his   delirious  words.   These  
people   also   thought   that   gods   carried   out   divine   punishments   through   the  
madman’s   killings   and   arson.   Therefore,   they   would   fear   and   worship   him.   In  
medieval  times,  priests  thought  that  he  was  possessed  by  demons  and  would  whip  
and  confine  him,  even  burn  him  alive   to  exorcise   the  demons  and  save  his   soul.   It  
was  not  until  the  modern  era  that  people  realized  that  he  had  a  mental  disorder  and  
needed  to  be  treated  as  a  patient.19    
  
In  his  version  of  the  “History  of  Madness,”  religious  beliefs  motivated  the  faithful  to  
inflict   harm   on   people’s   bodies.   In   this   passage,   being   “modern”   and   “civilized”  
means  the  separating  faith  from  knowledge,  consequently  reducing  violence.  “Savage  
people”  believed  that  violence  was  divine  punishment  and  accepted  it  as  their  destiny.  
For  Zhou,   the  European  Middle  Ages  were   the  historical   equivalent  of  a   cautionary  
 
19  Zhou,  “On  Arresting  Homosexuals”  关于捉同性恋爱,  Collected  Essays  vol.6,  449.    
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example:   an   age  when   religious  prelates   reigned,  using  violence  with   the  professed  
aim   of   achieving   truth   and   justice.   It   was   in   this   sense   that   the   persecution   of  
homosexuals  by  the  Nazis  was  a  regression  to  the  Middle  Ages.    
            Zhou’s  purpose  was  not  only   to  criticize  Nazi  Germany  but  also   to  observe  how  
China  had   regressed.  This  made  particular   sense   in   the   1930s,  when   the  Nationalist  
government  was  developing   relationship  with   the  Nazis.   To  him,   however,  China’s  
situation   was   even   worse   than   Germany’s.   The   problem   was   not   the   violent  
persecution  of  homosexuals,  but   the   legitimization  of  practices   like   ruthless  killings,  
cannibalism,  and  rape—at  least  as  they  were  recorded  in  unofficial  histories野史.  As  
Zhou   pointed   out   in   1936,   he   and   his   intellectual   nemesis   Lu   Xun   had   a   common  
interest  in  reading  about  historical  catastrophes  in  unofficial  histories.20  Recalling  the  
unofficial  accounts  he  read  in  early  years,  Zhou  confessed  that  the  Sichuan  massacres  
committed  by  Zhang  Xianzhong  张献忠  (1606-­‐‑1647)  during  the  late  Ming  had  left  the  
deepest  impression  on  him.  Fascinated  by  how  “advanced”  the  technology  of  violence  
was,  Lu  Xun  attributed   the  killing   to  Zhang’s  political  desperation,  which  had  been  
provoked   by   the   impossibility   of   his   taking   the   throne.21  On   another   occasion   he  
questioned  how  the  massacre  victims  could  have  accepted  their  destiny  without  any  
resistance. 22   Differing   from   Lu   Xun’s   politicized   reading,   Zhou’s  
psychological/psychoanalytic   reading   of   the   victims   and   victimizers   focused   on   the  
ways   in   which   these   ruthless   killings   compromised   humanity   itself.   Another  
unforgettable  book  was  Record  of  My  Past  Trauma  思痛记,  written  by  Li  Xiaochi  李小池  
(1842-­‐‑1903).  Li  had  been  caught  by  the  Taiping  rebels  and  bore  witness  to  their  violent  
acts.   Zhou   complained   in   1940   that   nobody,   including   Hu   Shi   胡适   (1891-­‐‑1962),  
understood  his  obsession  with  such  books.23  The  unofficial  accounts  functioned  as  the  
common   ground   for   the   Zhou   brothers   to   construct   a   counter-­‐‑memory   about   the  
Chinese   nation   that   could   stand   apart   from   the   imagined   glorious  Confucian   social  
order  constructed  by  official  historians.  Reading  the  terror  recorded  in  their  writings  
marked  a  disenchanting  moment  in  Zhou’s  encounter  with  social  reality  and  formed  
his  major  point  of  reference  in  his  conceptualization  of  the  modern.    
            The  types  of  historical  violence  Zhou  focused  on  are  those   inherent  to  Confucian  
ideology;   cannibalism,   one   such   type   of   violence,   constantly   haunted   him.   Literary  
and  historical  accounts  of  cannibalism  in  ancient  China  are  not  difficult   to   find.  The  
symbolic  use  of  cannibalism  in  defining  Chinese  culture  became  widely  known  with  
the  publication  of  Wu  Yu  吴虞  (1872-­‐‑1949)  and  Lu  Xun’s  works  in  the  late  1910s.  For  
Wu  and  Lu  Xun,  invoking  cannibalism  was  more  or  less  a  rhetorical  tactic  they  could  
use  to  condemn  Confucianism.  For  Zhou,  the  corporeal  dimension  of  cannibalism  was  
not  to  be  ignored:  physical  cannibalism  became  symbolic,  while  the  symbolic  variety  
 
20  Zhou,  “On  Lu  Xun”  关于鲁迅,  Collected  Essays  vol.7,  434.  
21  Lu  Xun,  “Random  Thoughts  during  Sickness”  病后杂谈,  Complete  Works  of  Lu  Xun  鲁迅全集  
vol.6,  (Beijing:  Renmin  wenxue  chubanshe,  2005),  170-­‐‑71.  
22  Lu  Xun,  “Random  Notes  in  the  Cool  of  the  Morning”  晨凉漫记,  Complete  Works  vol.5,  248-­‐‑49.  
23  Zhou,  “Record  of  My  Past  Trauma,”  Collected  Essays  vol.8,  368-­‐‑69.  
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endorsed   the   physical   consumption   of   human   flesh.   He   stated   in   1925   that   the  
Chinese   are   a   cannibalistic   people:   “Symbolically   speaking,   there   is   the  man-­‐‑eating  
Confucian   ethical   code.   For   those  positivists  who   ask   for   evidence,  we   suggest   that  
they  read  history.”  Then  he   turned  to  discuss  “the  most  celebrated  event”:   the  Song  
loyalists  from  Shandong  managed  to  travel  to  the  royal  court’s  new  southern  location;  
en  route,   they  lived  on  dried  human  flesh.24  This   traumatic  event   lingered  in  Zhou’s  
mind.   In   1947,   he   wrote   a   piece   of   doggerel   about   it   while   being   imprisoned   as   a  
traitor:  
  
Reading  unofficial  history,  I  often  feel  like  I  am  encountering  ghosts  and  goblins;    
They  occupy  my  mind  in  the  day  and  break  into  my  dreams  at  midnight.    
[…]    
There  were  the  Shandong  loyalists  during  the  Jingkang  Reign  [1126-­‐‑1127].    
Loyal  and  righteous,  they  survived  on  human  flesh  as  they  traveled  south.    
Some  leftovers  were  still  there  when  they  arrived  at  the  capital  city.    
Submissively,   the   “two-­‐‑legged   lambs”   approached   the   cooking   vessel.   It   is   indeed  
lamentable.  
How  privileged  they  were  to  be  made  into  smoked  jerky!    
Chewed  by  the  loyalists,  their  flesh  was  transformed  into  the  righteous  qi.    
Eating  human  flesh  could  bring  enormous  fortune.  
Eventually,  those  cannibals  will  accomplish  outstanding  achievements.    
Praised  for  being  capable  and  virtuous,  they  will  lecture  in  academies.    
Distinguished  and  influential,  they  will  engage  in  political  affairs.    
As  ephemeral  as  a  single  day,  a  thousand  years  pass  by,    
There  is  no  difference  between  the  present  and  the  past.    
The  so-­‐‑called  “new  trends”  are  nothing  but  a  deception,    
If  things  from  the  past  return  to  our  life.25    
  
The  poem  is  written  in  a  casual  style  conjoining  seriousness  with  lighthearted  humor.  
In   the   words   of   Kiyama   Hedio,   it   combines   a   “playful   freestyle   and   a   critical  
moralism.”26  Titled  “Spring  Purification  Festival”  修禊,  it  reveals,  in  a  deeply  sarcastic  
tone,   how   the   human   body   itself   became   an   object   of   consumption   and   how  
 
24  Zhou,  “Eating  Martyr”  吃烈士,  Collected  Essays  vol.  4,  245.  The  story  was  originally  recorded  
by   Zhuang  Chuo   (1079-­‐‑1149)   in   his  Chicken  Ribs  鸡肋编.   Based   on   similar   records,   Yu  Hua’s  
1988  novella  Classical  Love  古典爱情  provides  graphic  and  disturbing  scenes  of   transactions   in  
the  human  flesh  market.  See  Yu  Hua’s  Classical  Love  (Beijing:  renmin  wenxue  chubanshe,  2006),  
1-­‐‑39.  
25  Zhou,  Poems  Written   in   the  Tiger  Bridge  Prison  老虎桥杂诗,   ed.  Zhi  An   (Shijiazhuang:  Hebei  
jiaoyu  chubanshe,  2002),  48-­‐‑49.  
26  Kiyama Hideo, Zhou Zuoren during the Sino-Japanese War 北京苦住庵记, trans. Zhao Jinghua 
(Beijing: sanlian shudian, 2008), 238.  
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cannibalism   contributed   to   the   loyalists’   righteousness.   To   Zhou,   the   absurdity   of  
reality  could  only  be  depicted  using  such  a  style.27    
            What  disturbed  him  was  not  only  the  cannibalistic  act  as  such,  but  its  glorification,  
legitimization,   and   sacralization   accomplished   in   the   name   of   resisting   foreign  
invasions,   maintaining   unconditional   loyalty   to   the   emperor,   and   promoting  
righteousness.  The   celebrated   cannibalism  of   the  Song   loyalists   in   the  poem   implies  
that  political  beliefs  demand  human  sacrifice  in  a  literal  sense.  Picturing  the  loyalists  
chewing   dried   human   flesh   and   transforming   it   into   the   righteous   qi,   Zhou  
substantiates   the   deep   connection   between   the   corporeal   and   the   ideological.  
Therefore,  it  is  sarcastic  as  well  as  realistic  when  he  writes  that  it  is  an  “honor”  for  the  
victims   to  sacrifice   their  bodies   for   the  great  cause.   In  such  a  political  discourse,   the  
killing  and  eating  of  the  anonymous,  innocent  civilians  not  only  becomes  acceptable,  
but   also   acquires   a   sublime   status   and   an   aura.   To   borrow   from   Yue   Gang’s  
discussion  of  the  gender-­‐‑specific  cannibalism  in  Three  Kingdoms,  “the  victim  is  offered  
as  food  to  the  political  ‘phallus’.”28    
            What   made   it   even   more   unacceptable   to   Zhou   was   that   cannibalism   was  
“aestheticized”  through  the  mediation  of  language  by  the  cannibal-­‐‑loyalists,  who  had  
the  leisure  to  name  the  slim  senior  male  they  ate  “more  firewood  is  needed”  饶把火,  
the  young   female  “better-­‐‑tasting   than   lamb”  不慕羊,   and   the  small   child  “both   flesh  
and   bones   are   mushy”  合骨烂,   while   giving   all   the   common   name   of   “two-­‐‑legged  
lamb”   两脚羊.   Such   stylized   and   flippant   naming   indicated   that,   desperate   and  
starving  as  they  were,   the  cannibals  still  wrung  pleasure  from  the  act  of  eating  their  
fellow  humans.  The  dual  functions  of  the  mouth,  eating  and  speaking,  thus  formed  a  
mutually   enhancing   relationship:   eating   human   flesh   could   not   in   itself   provide  
sufficient  gratification;  it  had  to  be  recognized  and  fixed  in  the  symbolic  order,  which,  
in  Lacanian  terms,  is  language  itself.  Lu  Xun  also  paid  particular  attention  to  this  case,  
regarding   such   euphemistic   naming   as   a   political   tactic   to   legitimize   cannibalism:  
Consuming  human  flesh  became  justifiable  only  with  a  linguistic  conversion,  through  
which  human  beings  became  animals  and  flesh  became  meat.29  Zhou  went  beyond  the  
political   domain,   viewing   the   “aesthetic   cannibalism”   as   a   symptomatic   act   that  
marked  the  point  of  no  return  for  the  fall  of  humanity,  an  indicator  of  “the  total  death  
of   the   human   heart   and   soul.”30  As   Howard   Goldblatt   puts   it,   cannibalism   is   “the  
ultimate  secular  taboo,  for  at  its  most  extreme,  it  combines  the  sin/crime  of  murder,  in  
the  pursuit  of  revenge,  survival,  or  (as   in  Larson'ʹs  cartoon)  curiosity  and  pleasure;  a  
repudiation   of   the   sanctity   of   mortal   remains;   and   the   removal   of   the   veneer   of  
 
27  Shu   Wu,   Zhou   Zuoren:   His   Merits  and   Demerits周作人的是非功过   (Beijing:   renmin   wenxue  
chubanshe,  1993),  113,  248.  
28  Yue  Gang,  The  Mouth  that  Begs  (Durham:  Duke  University  Press,  1999),  57.  
29  Lu  Xun,  “Body  Search”  抄靶子,  Complete  Works  vol.5,  215-­‐‑217.  
30  Zhou,  “On  Man-­‐‑eating”  谈食人,  Collected  Essays  vol.7,  613.  It   is  renamed  as  “Exotic  Events  in  
History”  谈史志奇  in  Talks  in  the  Candle  Light秉烛谈  (Shanghai:  Beixin  shuju,  1940).  
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civilized   behavior.”31  Ironically,   Zhou   observed   that   it   was   always   those   cannibal-­‐‑
loyalists  who  fell  below  the  standards  of  civilized  humanity  who  later  gained  control  
of  knowledge  production  and  political  power.  
            Zhou’s  point  was  that  such  phenomena  were  not  unique  in  history.  As  we  can  see,  
this   poem   is   framed   by   his   apprehension   that   cannibalistic   ghosts   are   being  
reincarnated   in   China:   while   physical   cannibalism   might   have   ceased   to   exist,  
symbolic   cannibalism   still   prospered.   This   is   why   he   turns   on   the   May   Fourth  
intellectuals   toward   the   end   of   the   poem.   He   suggests   that   they   are   precise  
reincarnations   of   the   cannibals   his   poem   excoriates,   and   that   their   pursuit   of   the  
“modern”  merely  covers  up  the  resumption  of  historical  violence.  By  using  the  term  
“new  trends”  in  his  poem,  according  to  Chen  Yimin,  Zhou  was  punning  on  the  title  of    
The  Renaissance  新潮,   a   journal   edited  by  Fu  Sinian  傅斯年   (1896-­‐‑1950).   Fu  had  been  
Zhou’s  disciple  at  Peking  University  during   the  Enlightenment  years  and  held  high  
official   positions   in   the   KMT   government   in   the   1940s.   It   might   have   been   Fu’s  
unsympathetic  perception  of  Zhou  as  a  traitor  after  the  Sino-­‐‑Japanese  War  (1937-­‐‑1945)  
that   motivated   him   to   write   this   poem.32   However,   Zhou’s   critical   view   of   the  
Enlightenment  should  be  understood  more  as  an  effort  to  reflect  on  the  dilemmas  of  
Chinese  modernity  itself  than  as  a  personal  act  of  retaliation.    
In   the   Enlightenment’s   effort   to   achieve   modernity,   cannibalistic   Confucianism  
was  to  be  cleansed  from  the  corpus  of  Chinese  culture  as  the  “barbaric”  cultural  Other.  
Whereas   for   Lu   Xun,   the   modernizing   project   relied   on   the   children   who   had   not  
eaten  human  flesh  and  thus  could  escape  the  stigma  of  cannibalism,  Zhou  was  more  
pessimistic:   there  was  no   escape,   at   least   for   the   intellectuals   of   his   generation  who  
claimed  to  be  “modern.”  Such  a  view  reminds  us  of  Benedetto  Croce’s  famous  maxim:  
“All   history   is   contemporary   history,”   by  which  he  means   “all   serious   study   of   the  
past  is  informed  by  the  problems  and  needs  of  the  writer’s  own  time.”33  The  problem  
for  Zhou  was  mainly  the  inescapable  continuity  of  history,  which  determined  that  the  
“barbaric”  cultural  Other  was  never  far  from  the  modern.34  
 
31  Howard  Goldblatt,   “Forbidden   Food:   ‘The   Saturnicon’   of  Mo  Yan,”  World   Literature  Today,  
74.3  (2000):  477.  Gary  Larson  (1950-­‐‑  )  is  a  U.S.  cartoonist  who  authored  The  Far  Side.  
32  Chen  Yimin,  “The  Lost  Poems  of  Zhou  Zuoren  and  His  Life  in  the  Zhongshe  Prison  忠舍轶诗
与狱中的周作人,  Lu  Xun  yanjiu  yuekan   3(1999):57-­‐‑62.   In   another  doggerel  poem  written   in   the  
same  period  of  time,  Zhou  directly  referred  to  Fu  as  the  righteous  loyalists.  See  Kiyama Hideo, 
Zhou Zuoren during the Sino-Japanese War, 281-­‐‑3.  For  Fu’s  purges  of   the  “traitors”  after   the  
war  based  on  the   idea  of   loyalty,  see  Wang  Fan-­‐‑sen,  Fu  Ssu-­‐‑Nien:  A  Life  in  Chinese  History  and  
Politics  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2000),  177-­‐‑179.  
33  Dain   A.   Trafton,   “Political   Doctrine   in   Croce’s  History   of   the   Kingdom   of  Naples,”   in   The  
Legacy   of  Benedetto  Croce:  Contemporary  Critical  Views,   eds.   Jack  D'ʹAmico,  Dain  A.  Trafton   and  
Massimo  Verdicchio  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto  Press,  1999),  103.  
34  Yue  Gang   argues   that   “In its drive to modernize, the May Fourth new culture movement 
inherited a colonial legacy that was infused with the teleology and ideology embedded in 
historiographical writing since the Enlightenment”   (The  Mouth   that   Begs,   71).   He   goes   on   to  
argue  that  Lu  Xun  borrowed  the  anthropological  discourse  on  cannibalism  to  diagnose  the  old  
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Intellectual  Persecution  and  Institutional  Violence  
  
In   the   early   1920s,   Zhou   Zuoren   insisted   that,   despite   the   intensifying   political  
struggles,  the  most  dangerous  tendency  in  China  was  the  persecution  of  intellectuals,  
which  began  with  the  project  of  unifying  thought  among  citizens.  In  1920,  he  stressed  
that   although  people  might   live   a   similar  material   life,   their   spiritual   lives   radically  
diverged.  Individual  differences  were  irreducible  and  could  not  be  annihilated  in  the  
name  of  “Great  Harmony,”  for  such  attempts  would  lead  to  a  new  form  of  despotism  
that   sapped   culture   and   thought   of   its   uniqueness.35  Ironically,   he   considered   the  
Enlightenment   itself   the   heir   of   traditional   tactics   of   repression   and   oppression.  
Zhou’s   such   view  was   indebted   to   his   reading   of   European   intellectual   history.  He  
cited   the   British   scholar   J.   B.   Bury   on   the   history   of   freedom  of   thought   in   Europe:  
“[T]he  intellectual  justification  of  the  Protestant  rebellion  against  the  Church  had  been  
the   right   of   private   judgment,   that   is,   the   principle   of   religious   liberty.   But   the  
Reformers  had  asserted  it  only  for  themselves,  and  as  soon  as  they  had  framed  their  
own  articles  of   faith,   they  had  practically   repudiated   it.”36  Zhou  noted   that   this  was  
even  the  case  in  literature:  once  a  new  trend  establishes  itself  as  mainstream,  it  starts  
to   suppress   newer   ones   that   challenge   its   position.   He   was   not   surprised   upon  
hearing   the  news   in   1925   that  Leo  Tolstoy’s  works  were  banned   in   Socialist  Russia:  
“The  Russians  were  a  religious  people,  but  now  the  social  system  has  changed  and  it  
is  said  that  God  and  the  Bible  have  lost  their  followers.”37  The  novelty  lay  only  in  the  
 
China,  while   the   discourse  was   transformed   into   a   colonial   discourse   due   to   the   imbalanced  
power   relationship   between  China   and   the  West.   It   is   in   this   colonial   discourse   that   Lu  Xun  
formed  a  “colonial  gaze”  to  define  China  as  “cannibalistic,”  and  unleashed  his  “hatred  and  self-­‐‑
hatred,   disgust   and   distain”   towards   the   Chinese   through   his   allegorical   representation   of  
cannibalism   (The  Mouth   that  Begs,   100).  However,  we   should   also  notice   that   the  postcolonial  
perspective  might  not  be  sufficient,  considering  the  fact  that  the  Zhou  brothers’  early  traumatic  
experience   in   reading   the   stories  on  cannibalism  happened   long  before   they  were  exposed   to  
Western  anthropology.  
35  Zhou,   “The   Ideal   and  Reality  of   the  New  Village”  新村的理想与实际,  Collected  Essays   vol.2,  
240.  
36  Zhou,  “Tolerance  in  Literature  and  Arts”  文艺上的宽容,  Collected  Essays  vol.2,  512,  cited  from  
J.  B.  Bury,  A  History  of  Freedom  of  Thought  (Cambridge,  MA:  The  University  Press,  1913)  81.   In  
his  1936  book  The  Right  to  Heresy: Castellio against Calvin,  Stephen  Zweig  also  observed  similar  
phenomena  in  European  religious  history.      
37   Zhou,   “Matters   about   Tolstoy”   托尔斯泰的事情 ,   Collected   Essays   vol.4,   68.   Chinese  
intellectuals  were  divided   in   their   attitude   toward   the  newly  established  Soviet  Russia.  Zhou  
belonged  to  the  camp  that  questioned  the  Soviet  society  for  its  endangering  individual  freedom  
and  its  violent  approaches  towards  social  change.  Xu  Zhimo,  for  example,  expressed  his  deep  
concern   similar   to   that   of   Zhou   after   traveling   to   Russia.   He   writes,   “They   believed   the  
existence   of   the   Paradise,   which   could   be   materialized.   But   there   is   a   sea,   a   sea   of   blood,  
between  the  current  reality  and  that  Paradise.  Human  have  to  swim  through  the  sea  of  blood  
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fact   that,   “In   the  past   one   thing  was  banned  and  now   it   is   another.   In   the  past,   the  
suppression   was   from   the   emperor   and   now   it   is   from   the   masses.   Yet   both   are  
equally   arbitrary   and   despotic.”38  The   old   system   had   been   overthrown,   but   what  
survived  was  the  same  mechanism  of  intellectual  persecution.  
Several   events   in   the   1920s   alarmed   Zhou   because   they   demonstrated   the  
tendency   of   violent   suppression   of   dissent   in   the   intellectual   fields.   In   1923-­‐‑1924,   a  
group  of  scientists  led  by  Ding  Wenjiang  丁文江  (1887-­‐‑1936)  waged  a  war  against  the  
so-­‐‑called  metaphysicians,  such  as  Zhang  Junmai  张君劢  (1886-­‐‑1969),  who  proposed  to  
define  the  meaning  of  life  beyond  the  domain  of  the  sciences.  During  the  debate,  the  
scientists   called   Zhang   a   “ghost   of   metaphysics”  玄學鬼   and   wanted   to   beat   him  
down.  In  1924,  Zhou  argued  that  the  necessary  course  was  not  to  destroy  the  “ghosts”  
with  radical  measures,  but  to  prevent  them  from  harming  the  living.  In  Zhou’s  view,  
what   the   European  Church   had   done―burning   people’s   bodies   to   keep   them   from  
falling   into  hell―was  to  be  avoided.  “We  could  not  adopt   it  because  our  purpose   is  
the   opposite:   we   intend   to   exorcise   the   ghosts,   and   therefore   we   need   different  
approaches.”39  This   can   be   read   as   a   footnote   to   his   proposal   for   “a   revolution   of  
thought,”  which  aimed  to  get  rid  of  the  old  beliefs  instead  of  persecuting  those  who  
held  them.  Behind  his  sarcastic  remark  about  the  Inquisition  lay  his  apprehension  that  
“evil   seeds”   might   be   planted   amid   the   effort   to   beat   down   the   “evil.”   If   science  
became  the  only  criterion  for  judging  the  truth  of  a  claim,  it  could  turn  into  absolute  
scientism   and   even   become   an   aggressive   force   for   suppressing   other   voices.  
Following  the  same  line  of  reasoning,  he  questioned  the  anti-­‐‑Christianity  movement,  
which  proposed  a   total  elimination  of   the  religion,  and  expressed  concern  about   the  
return  of   the  despotic  “ghost”   through   it.40  As  he  observed,  although   the  movement  
might   have   a   legitimate   motive,   the   oppression   and   terror   implicit   in   its   violent  
approaches   were   indefensible.41  Such   approaches   were   no   different   than   what   the  
Boxers   had  done;   their   spirit  might   still   be   haunting  modern  people.42 Seen   as   “evil  
seeds”  planted  by   the  Enlightenment,   the  movements   that   looked   to   science   to   save  
the  nation  could  eventually  incite  large-­‐‑scale  physical  violence.    
 
before   they   can   reach   the  other   shore.  Now   they  decided   to  have   the   sea  of  blood   come   into  
being  first.”  Complete  Works  of  Xu  Zhimo  徐志摩全集  vol.4  (HK:  Commercial  Press.  1983),  109.  
38  Zhou,  “Sambenito”  黑背心,  Collected  Essays  vol.4,  206.  
39  Zhou,  “Our  Enemy”  我们的敌人,  Collected  Essays  vol.3,  561.  
40  See   Ozaki,   “The   Zhou   Zuoren   Who   Parted   Ways   with   Chen   Duxiu,”   145-­‐‑162;   Shu,   Zhou  
Zuoren:  His  Merits  and  Demerits,  117-­‐‑126;  Ni  Moyan,  Zhou  Zuoren  and  His  Bitter  Rain  Study  苦雨
斋主人周作人   (Shanghai:   Shanghai   renmin   chubanshe,   2003),   178-­‐‑185;  Qian  Liqun,  21  Lectures  
on  Zhou  Zuoren  周作人研究二十一讲  (Beijing:  zhonghua  shuju,  2004),  193-­‐‑208.  
41  Qian,  21  Lectures  on  Zhou  Zuoren,  197.  
42  Zhou,  “Reading  the  Bloodshed  in  Beijing”读京华碧血录,  Collected  Essays  vol.3,  420.  
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The  White   Terror   of   1927  marked   the   end   of   the   Enlightenment   project   in   China.43  
While   there   are   different   interpretations   of   the   KMT’s   ruthless   killing   of   the  
Communists,   Zhou,   in   1928,   summarized   the   massacre   as   the   culmination   of   a  
pervasive   campaign   to   persecute   intellectuals.44  In   view   of   the   anti-­‐‑Christianity  
movement  and  its  subsequent  development,  Zhou  predicted  the  White  Terror:  “I  have  
feared  the  rise  of  a  reactionary  movement  for  the  past  six  years,  and  now  it  is  finally  
here.  Much   as   our   sage  Kang  Youwei  康有为   said,   ‘the  prophecy  has  unfortunately  
come  true.’”  Zhou  defined  those  events  as  “reactionary”  in  the  sense  that  they  aimed  
at  unifying  people’s  thoughts;  they  were  not  only  manufactured  by  outside  forces  to  
suppress   the   Enlightenment   but   also   generated   from  within   the   Enlightenment,   by  
those  who  saw  extending  violence  as  a  logical  way  to  achieve  consensus—or  at  least  
the   appearance   of   it.   To   Zhou,   the   superficial   distinctions   between   the   old   and   the  
new,   the  backward  and   the  progressive,  were  unimportant  when   they   fed   the   same  
hostile  attitude  toward  intellectual  freedom:  “Killing  people  for  their  thought  is  most  
horrible.   If  China  wants   a   better   future,   such  killing  must   stop,   and  new   schools   of  
thoughts   in   politics,   economics,   religion,   and   art   should   be   allowed   to   express  
themselves.”45  When   the   intellectual   field  was  split  and  most   intellectuals   took  sides  
with  either  the  KMT  or  the  CCP,  Zhou  distinguished  himself  as  a   liberal   intellectual  
who  endeavored   to  go  beyond  politics.  For   that   reason  he  underplayed   the  political  
causes  of  the  events  and  decried  killing  people  for  their  thoughts  as  unacceptable,  no  
matter   what   purposes   were   served   by   it.   Yet   his   proposal   for   intellectual   freedom  
could   not   be   heard   by   those   engaged   in   the   killing;   even   their   victims  might   have  
regarded  Zhou’s  position  as  naïve.    
            The  White  Terror  was  an  unspeakable   trauma  for  him.   It  went  so   far  beyond  his  
rational   comprehension   that   he   had   to   attribute   its   violent   course   to   psychological  
traits  embedded  in  the  minds  of  his  countrymen.  He  expressed  his  frustration  in  1928:    
  
It  seems  that  Chinese  people  regard  killing  not  as  a  negative  means  to  prevent  harm  
(assuming   it   is   effective)   but   as   the   end   in   itself.   They   take   advantage   of   the  
occasions   to   satisfy   their   desire   for   killing.   I   cannot   guarantee   that   this   does   not  
happen   in   other   countries,   but   it   is   certainly   a   deep-­‐‑rooted   hereditary   disease   in  
China.   From   emperor   and   generals   to   scholars   and   hooligans,   all   are   severely  
infected.  If  China  perishes  in  the  future,  this  disease,  rather  than  imperialist  invasion,  
will  be  the  final  cause.  46  
 
43  For   a   detailed   account   of   the   cleansing,   see   Yang  Kuisong,   “A   Study   on   the  KMT’s   Party-­‐‑
Cleansing  Movement  in  Nanjing  in  1927”  1927年南京国民党清党运动研究,  Lishi  yanjiu  6(2005):  
42-­‐‑62.  
44  Zhou,  “Postscript  to  Talk  about  Tigers”  谈虎集后记,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  434.  
45  Ibid.  
46  Zhou,  “How  Should  It  Be  Discussed?”  怎么说才好,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  319-­‐‑320.  
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From  the  Qing’s  killing  of  the  revolutionaries  and  Yuan  Shikai’s  袁世凯  killing  of  the  
Nationalists,   to   the   Nationalists’   killing   of   the   Communists,47  history   “progressed”  
into  the  modern  era.  People  were  obsessed  with  killing,  regardless  of  right  or  wrong.  
The  result  was  defeat   for  all   factions,  and   triumph   for  violence  alone.  He  could  still  
comprehend  violence  as  a  means,  yet  he  could  not  rationalize  it  as  an  end,  unless  he  
accepted   it   as   something   innate   in   the   psyche   of   the   Chinese   people.   In   1927  Mao  
Zedong  毛泽东   (1893-­‐‑1976)   defined   such   violence   as   the  motor   of   revolution   in   his  
“Report  of  an  Investigation  into  the  Peasant  Movement  in  Hunan.”  Mao  believed  he  
had   found   the   truth  about   liberating  China,   a   truth   that   promised   to   erase  all   other  
terrors  with  the  greatest  Terror  that  ever  existed.  Zhou,  on  the  other  hand,  regarded  
all  terrors  as  equal,  and  the  latest  obsession  added  but  another  link  to  the  unbreakable  
chain  of  violence  in  the  country.    
In   Zhou’s   understanding   of   the   contemporary   China,   the   European   Inquisition  
became   a   necessary   point   of   reference.   As   he   wrote   in   1928,   “Chinese   people   are  
inclined   to   kill   others   for   their   thought,   accusing   them   of   being   heretical   and   of  
violating   orthodox   teachings.   The   same   phenomena   also   existed   in   Europe   from  
ancient   times   through   the   nineteenth   century.”48  Naturally,   he   used   the   term   “Dark  
Ages”  (traditionally  used  to  describe  the  period  beginning  with  the  fall  of  the  Roman  
Empire   and   ending  with   the  Renaissance)   to   describe   his   own   time,   in  which   “The  
beasts  in  the  forests  have  finally  stopped  harming  people,  but  the  invisible  ghosts  and  
spirits   are   still   wondering   around   to   claim   the   souls   of   people.”   Under   such  
circumstances,   the  political  slogans  such  as  “of   the  people,”  “by   the  people”  or  “the  
freedom   of   assembly   and   speech”   became   meaningless.   He   wrote   that   his   prime  
concern  was  to  examine  “repressing  the  freedom  of  thought  in  cases  such  as  literary  
and  religious  inquisitions.”  In  western  cultural  history,  the  two  cultural  traditions  that  
attracted  his  attention  were  the  auto-­‐‑da-­‐‑fé  and  sambenito.49  The  auto-­‐‑da-­‐‑fé  or  “the  act  of  
faith”  was  a  public  ceremony  performed  during  the  Spanish  Inquisition  to  punish  the  
heretics   and   apostates,   and   the   sambenito   was   the   garment   worn   by   the   convicted  
heretics   during   the   ceremony.   In   his   writings,   both   become   profound   symbols   of  
intellectual  persecution.  
            Zhou  then  targeted  the  agent  of  the  Inquisition,  the  Catholic  Church.  Although  he  
appreciated   the   tradition   of   humanistic   thought   within   Christianity   and   defended  
freedom   of   belief,   in   1927   he   still   criticized   the   Church   for   having   launched   the  
Inquisition,  harshly  pointing  out  its  internal  contradictions:  
  
Christianity  is  a  religion  of  fraternity,  but  it  has  an  old  tradition,  and  God  sometimes  
is   tyrannical.   In  addition,   there   is  a  Satan   just  as   there  are  clowns   in   theater.  Thus,  
 
47  In   his   writing,   Zhou   never   denounced   the   Communists’   killing   of   landlords   prior   to   the  
White   Terror.   However,   he   did   question   communism   as   a   violent,   dogma-­‐‑driven   social  
movement.  
48  Zhou,  “On  Witchcraft”关于妖术,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  531.  
49  Zhou,  “Sambenito,”  203.  
 
 
38   Chinese  Literature:  Essays,  Articles,  Reviews  36  (2014)  
 
 
the  heretical  and  the  orthodox  opposed  each  other  and  such  conflicts  have  hindered  
cultural  development.  It  is  written  in  Exodus  22.18,  “You  shall  not  permit  a  sorceress  
to  live.”  If  one  believes  in  the  existence  of  witchcraft,  there  will  be  an  anti-­‐‑witchcraft  
movement,  which  is  no  less  problematic  than  witchcraft  itself.50    
  
With  its  binary  view  of  good  and  evil,  Christianity  became  inherently  violent  through  
its  demand  that  an  evil  be  created  and  then  conquered.  Zhou  understood  this  moral  
equivalent   of   binary   opposition   as   a   Daoist   dialectical   process,   in   which   opposing  
forces  not  only  clashed  with,  but  also  transformed  into  each  other:  the  Church  became  
evil  when,   seeking   to  purge   evil   itself,   it   violently   removed  witchcraft.  The   ruthless  
killing  proved  that  the  Church  itself  believed  in  the  truth  of  witchcraft,  for  only  those  
who  believed  in  the  effectiveness  of  witchcraft  would  wage  a  war  against   it.51  In  the  
1930s  and  1940s,  Zhou  continued  to  explore  the  genealogy  of  intellectual  persecution  
and  used  it  to  draw  parallels  to  terrifying  modern  violence.  In  1937,  he  associated  the  
European   Inquisition   with   the   intellectual   persecution   in   Chinese   history   when  
discussing   the   role   of   the   cat   in   witchcraft.   Such   “ruling   by   terror”   goes   beyond  
national  boundaries  since  humankind  shares  the  same  fate.  He  was  “deeply  terrified  
and   shocked,   and   could   not   look   at   those   events   with   indifference   and   delight,  
because  mankind   is  one.” 52  To  him,   the  Chinese   literary   inquisitions  were  similar   to  
witch  trials,  as  they  had  both  been  lingering  on  his  mind  and  oppressing  his  spirit.  
Zhou   rationalized  witchcraft,  whose   practitioners   he   regarded   as   the   victims   of  
Inquisition,   as   an   historical   phenomenon   deeply   associated   with   both   science   and  
religion.   In   a   1941   essay   on   The   History   of  Witchcraft   and   Demonology   by   Montague  
Summers,   he   discussed   the   nature   of   witchcraft   and   its   fate   in   the   Christian   era:  
“From  a  perspective  of  cultural  history,  witchcraft,  with  its  charms  and  spells,   is   the  
science  of  a  primitive  people.  It  is  based  on  the  natural  law.  While  science  is  based  on  
facts  and  can  be  verified,  witchcraft  is  founded  on  the  law  of  association  and  may  not  
necessarily   be   able   to   be   verified.”53  As   a   way   of   making   sense   of   the   world   and  
preserving   humanity,   witchcraft   contains   no   malign   or   mythical   element.  
Persecutions   based   on   such   accusations,   therefore,  were   unfounded,   and   he   “could  
not   stop   sympathizing  with   the  witches  who   played   the   various   tricks.   The   torture  
and   killing   in   the   Inquisition  was   unnecessary.”54  When   compared   to   the   polemical  
slurs  he  wrote   in   the  1920s,   the   seemingly   casual   term  “unnecessary”   illustrates   the  
more   resigned   and   detached   attitude   toward   violence   he   had   taken   over   the  
 
50  Zhou,  “From  Jews  to  Catholics”  从犹太人到天主教,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  61.  The  phrase  from  
Exodus   is   cited   from   the   NKJV   Study   Bible,   copyright   ©1997,   2007   by   Thomas   Nelson,   Inc.  
Used  by  permission.  
51  Ibid.    
52  Zhou,  “On  Cats”  赋得猫,  Collected  Essays  vol.7,  560.  
53  Zhou,  “The  History  of  Witchcraft  and  Demonology”  妖术史,  Collected  Essays  vol.8,  539.  
54  See  footnote  51.  
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intervening  decades.   Even  when   this   violence  was   irrationally   done   in   the   name   of  
progress,  national  salvation,  or  revolution,  it  could  by  then  do  little  to  raise  his  ire.    
  
The  Gendered  Body  and  the  Violence  of  the  Everyday  
 
            While  the  everyday  seldom  became  a  major  concern  to  Lu  Xun,  to  Zhou,  it  was  a  
domain   for   studying   the   consciousness   and   lifestyle   of   the   majority,   and   a   major  
battlefield   for   Enlightenment.  His   obsession  with   the   “trivial”  matters   such   as   food  
and   drink,   customs,   leisure   and   festivals   offended   some   leftist   critics   in   the   1930s.  
Commenting   on   the   habit   of   drinking,   he   defended   himself   in   1938:   “Although  
persuading  others  in  drink  is  a  trivial  matter,  I  am  continually  talking  about  it.  Am  I  
making   a   fuss   over   a   trifle?   Not   necessarily.   The   world   is   in   reverse   order.   Some  
trivial  matters  may  not   be   as   trivial   as   they   seem   to   be,   and  often   some   apparently  
significant   matters   may   not   be   as   significant   as   they   are   claimed.”55  Such   opinions  
subvert   grand   narratives   of   enlightenment,   national   salvation,   and   revolution.   The  
significance  of  the  trivial  matters  in  the  everyday  life,  however,  needed  to  be  defined.  
Some   scholars   have   argued   that   Zhou   “resacralized”   the   everyday   in   the   course   of  
denying   the   force  of   the  grand  narratives.  Such  an   impression  might  be  based  more  
on  the  literary  works  he  created  to  negate  the  political  reality.  As  Susan  Daruvala  puts  
it,   “By   equating   politics   and   religion   and   disconnecting   both   from   an   (implicit)  
ineffable,   Zhou   was   able   to   deflect the May Fourth nation-building project from what 
remained.   This  was   not   only   the   individual   but   also   the   ordinary   and   the   everyday  
which   were,   in   a   sense,   resacralized.   The   process   I   refer   to   as   resacralization   is  
most  clearly   understood   and   realized   in   relation   to   the   aesthetic   category   of   flavor  
(quwei).”56 It is insightful to highlight the significance of “the ordinary and the everyday” in 
Zhou’s aesthetic   construction. However,   beyond   the   aesthetic   domain,   no   indication  
can  be   found   that   he   resacralized   the   everyday   to   fill   the   center   of   signification   left  
empty   by   his   renunciation   of   mainstream   practice.   Rather,   he   celebrated   the  
corporeality  of  human  life,  promoting  the  everyday  as  a  desacralized,  mundane  space.  
It   is  a   space  celebrating  “life   for   life’s   sake,”  or  a   life  of  “decadence”   in   Ito  Noriya’s  
terms:   such   a   space   refused   to   serve   a   higher   political   purpose,   and   insisted   on  
regarding   the   (regulated)   leisure   as   the   end   in   itself.57  Putting   the   inverted   world  
order   back   into   its   “normal”   order,   the   everyday   became,   in   Zhou’s   rationale,   the  
major  site  upon  which  people  construct  the  meaning  of  their  life.    
            Assigning   epistemological   and   ontological   importance   to   the   everyday,   Zhou  
found  no  less  violence  when  turning  his  eyes  to  the  reality  of  the  everyday.  This  form  
 
55  Zhou,  “On  Encouraging  Others  to  Drink”  谈劝酒,  Collected  Essays  vol.8,  25.  
56  Susan   Daruvala,  Zhou   Zuoren   and   an   Alternative   Chinese   Response   to  Modernity   (Cambridge,  
MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  2000),  122.  
57  Noriya   Ito,   “Life   for   Life’s   Sake”   Seikatsu   no   tame   no   seikatsu,   Journal   of   the   Institute   for  
Advanced  Studies  on  Asia,  vol.155  (2009):  61-­‐‑92.  
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of  violence  might  not  be  as  visually  disturbing  or  intense  as  those  carried  out  during  
“significant”   social   events.   For   that   reason,   it   becomes   “invisible”   in   traditional  
historiography.   Through   the  mediation   of  moral,   ideological,   or   religious   doctrines,  
violence  was  transformed  into  a  legitimate  means  of  regulating  people’s  daily  conduct,  
to   sustain   the   (male-­‐‑centered)   social   order,   and   to   serve   allegedly  higher   social   and  
spiritual   purposes.   As presented in his writings,   everyday   violence   is   principally  
directed   toward   women.   To   some   extent,   the   doctrines   have   consolidated   their  
domination  of   the  everyday   through  applying  meticulous  “techniques”   for  negating  
the   female   body   and   repressing   sexual   desire,   and   through   instilling   contempt   for  
women.   Contesting   the   violence   of   the   everyday,   Zhou   regarded   it   critical   to  
transform   the   various   belief   systems   that   underpinned   it.   But   by   the   late   1910s   he  
realized  that  they  were  difficult  to  transform.  And  the  domain  of  the  everyday  rather  
often   became   the   stronghold   of   “savage”   beliefs.   While   discussing   Edward  
Carpenter’s  Love’s  Coming-­‐‑of-­‐‑Age  in  1918,  Zhou  cited  Havelock  Ellis:    
  
In   religion   and   politics   we   have,   after   a   great   struggle,   gained   the   priceless  
possibility  of   liberty  and  sincerity.  But   the  region  of   sex   is   still,   like  our  moral  and  
social   life   generally,   to   a   large   extent   unreclaimed;   there   still   exist   barbarous  
traditions  which  medieval  Christianity  has  helped  to  perpetuate,  so   that   the  words  
of   Pliny   regarding   the   contaminating   touch   of   a   woman,   who   has   always   been  
regarded   as,   in   a   peculiar   manner,   the   symbol   of   sex—“Nihil   facile   reperiabatur  
mulierum   profluvio   magis   monstrificum”—are   not   even   yet   meaningless.   Why  
should  the  sweetening  breath  of  science  be  guarded  from  this  spot?  Why  should  not  
“freedom  and  faith  and  earnestness”  be  introduced  here?  Our  attitude  towards  this  
part  of  life  affects  profoundly  our  attitude  towards  life  altogether.58    
  
Here  Ellis  points  out  an   important  phenomenon   in   the  West:   that  people’s  attitudes  
about  and  values  regarding  sex,  did  not  “progress”  with  the  progress  of  science.  Sex  
life   had   still   remained   off-­‐‑limits   to   scientific   investigation   through   the   end   of   the  
nineteenth  century.  Zhou  fully  accepted  Ellis’s  view  on  the  importance  of  sex  life,  and  
tried   to   prove   how   the   taboos   on   sex   compromised  people’s   general   quality   of   life.  
Meanwhile,   as   he   wrote   in   1926,   over   thousands   of   years,   the   lower   and   broader  
domain  of  people’s  life  was  as  static  as  the  bottom  of  the  sea.59  Thus,  it  was  difficult  to  
erase  the  pervasive  everyday  violence  associated  with  conventional  beliefs.    
            Against  the  religious  views  that  despise  the  body  as  impure  and  as  inferior  to  the  
soul  and  spirit,  Zhou  proposed  a  “pure  view”  净观 of  the  human  body  and  of  sexual  
desire.   He   translated   the   phrase   Ellis   cited   from   Pliny,   “Nihil   facile   reperiabatur  
mulierum   profluvio   magis   monstrificum”   as   “nothing   is   uglier   than   women’s  
menstrual   flow.”   The   phrase,  which   could   be   rendered  more   neutrally   as   “nothing  
 
58  Zhou,  “Love’s  Coming-­‐‑of-­‐‑Age”  爱的成年,  Collected  Essays  vol.2,  65-­‐‑6.  Cited  from  Havelock  Ellis,  
The  New  Spirit  (London:  George  Bell,  and  Sons,  1890),  126-­‐‑7.  
59  Zhou,   “Customs   on   Returning   from   A   Funeral   and   Buying   Water”  回丧与买水,   Collected  
Essays  vol.2,  415.  
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could   easily   be   found   that   is  more   remarkable   than   the  monthly   flux   of  woman,”60  
bore  severe  consequences  in  practice.  Dean-­‐‑Jones  has  pointed  out  that  Pliny’s  claims  
of   the   power   of   menstrual   women   were   used   during   the   Inquisition   to   identify  
witches.61  Zhou  indicated  that,  if  the  power  of  the  time-­‐‑honored  phrase  was  sustained  
by   Christianity   dogma,   it   could   engender   harmful   attempts   to   efface   menstrual  
“ugliness.”      In   other   words,   delegitimizing   the   female   body,   along   with   its   bodily  
discharges  and  desires,  paved  the  way  for  inflicting  violence  on  it.  
            Comparing   the   Bible   with   the   works   of   other   non-­‐‑Christian   cultures,   Zhou  
inferred  that  asceticism  in  Christianity  went  too  far  to   serve  the  needs  of  the  human  
body.   Although   not   being   against   the   idea   of   asceticism,   he  was   fully   aware   of   its  
negative   implications.   Following   Ellis,   he   argued   that   human   desire   should   be  
regulated,   but   only   for   making   its   enjoyment   stronger,   longer   lasting   and   more  
refined.  As  he  commented  on  Married  Love  by  Marie  Stopes,  “Religious  asceticism  is  
abominable.  Yet  it  is  possible  to  apply  reasonable  regulations  on  desire.  By  so  doing,  
not  only  could  pure  love  be  cultivated,  dreams  could  also  be  conceived  to  become  the  
seeds  of  art.”62  In  1927  he  cited  Ellis’s  opinion  that,  with  its  view  of  the  female  body,  
Christian  asceticism  denied  the  purity  and  beauty  of  erotic  love:  
  
The   breath   of   Christian   asceticism   had   passed   over   love;   it   was   no   longer,   as   in  
classic  days,  an  art  to  be  cultivated,  but  only  a  malady  to  be  cured.  The  true  inheritor  
of  the  classic  spirit  in  this,  as  in  many  other  matters,  was  not  the  Christian  world,  but  
the  world  of  1slam.  The  Perfumed  Garden  of  the  Sheik  Nefzoui  was  probably  written  
in  the  city  of  Tunis  early  in  the  sixteenth  century  by  an  author  who  belonged  to  the  
south  of  Tunis.  The  opening  invocation  clearly  indicates  that  it  departs  widely  from  
the  conception  of  love  as  a  disease:  “Praise  be  to  God  who  has  placed  man’s  greatest  
pleasure  in  the  natural  parts  of  woman,  and  has  destined  the  natural  parts  of  man  to  
afford  the  greatest  enjoyments  to  woman.”63    
  
Ellis  dreamed  of  a  classical  era  during  which  erotic  love  was  cultivated.  Zhou  might  
not  be  as  nostalgic  as  Ellis  was,  but  he  did  find  the  attitude  toward  erotic  love  in  some  
“heretical”  works—such  as  The  Perfumed  Garden  (which  he  doubtless  read  in  Burton'ʹs  
famous   translation)   and   Ovid'ʹs   Ars   Amatoria,—was   much   more   “natural”   and  
healthier   than   that   of   Christianity.   Both   works   celebrated   female-­‐‑centered   bodily  
enjoyment.   To   him,   such   views   were   quite   “modern.”64  As   for   Christianity,   the  
 
60  Cited   from   Marlene   Zuk,   Sexual   Selections:   What   We   Can   and   Can'ʹt   Learn   about   Sex   from  
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influence   of   its   outdated   views   of   the   female   body   still   prevailed,   no   matter   how  
much   reform   was   carried   out.   This   led   to   a   disappointing   result:   not   only   were  
women   still   despised   as   “chamber   pots”   by   the   religious   reformer   Martin   Luther  
(1483–1546),  misogyny  was  even  popular  among  some  modern  philosophers  such  as  
Schopenhauer,  Nietzsche,   and  Otto  Weininger.65  Zhou   insisted   that,   no  matter   how  
“modern”   their   ideas   appeared   to   be   or   how   stridently   they   might   denounce  
Christianity,   these   philosophers   were   still   under   its   sway   where   women   were  
concerned.  
          While   most   of   the   Enlightenment   thinkers   almost   exclusively   targeted  
Confucianism   during   and   after   the   Enlightenment,   Zhou   was   among   the   few   who  
brought   Buddhism   into   discussions   of   gender   and   sexuality. 66  He   argued   that  
Buddhism   in  China  had  played  a   role   comparable   to   that  of  Christianity   in  Europe.  
While  admitting  that  Buddhism,  through  its  benevolence,  sought  to  entice  women  to  
pursue  the  eternal  happiness  of  the  afterlife,  he  contested  its  view  of  the  female  body  
as   impure.   In   1924,  He   pointed   out   the   differences   between   the   Confucian   and   the  
Buddhist  views  on  women,  arguing  that  the  Confucian  biases  were  merely  based  on  
lived  experiences  and  could  be  changed  if  people’s   life  changed.  The  Buddhist  ones,  
by   contrast,   were   deeply   rooted   in   a   religious   interpretation   of   physiology,   which  
viewed   the   female   body   as   innately   inferior.   This   belief,   being   religious   rather   than  
empirical,   resisted   emendation.67  He  would   restate   this   opinion   in   later   years:   “The  
biased   opinions   of   Buddhism   and   Christianity,   they   are  more   horrible   in   that   they  
conceptualized   women   as   filthy   and   abominable   based   on   religious   beliefs   and  
superstitions.” 68   In   this   passage,   Zhou   seems   to   dichotomize   the   secular  
(Confucianism)   and   the   religious   (Buddhism).   For   this   reason,   he   goes   so   far   as   to  
express   optimism   regarding   China’s   situation,   “because   the   religious   influence   is  
weak.  The  contempt  for  women  mainly  came  from  the  Confucian  Ethical  Codes,  and  
is  based  on  rational  theory  and  lived  experiences.”69  Here  Zhou  mainly  focuses  on  the  
thought   of   Confucius   instead   of   the   doctrines   of   the   quasi-­‐‑religious   Neo-­‐‑
Confucianism.   Thus   what   he   offers   is   less   a   “scientific”   comparative   study   than   a  
humanistic  proposal  to  dismiss  the  religion-­‐‑based  practices.  
            As  he  observed  in  1936,  the  resentment  toward  women  in  Buddhism  was  reflected  
in   popular   Buddhist   literary   works   such   as   Precious  Scrolls   on   Liu   Xiang刘香宝卷,  
whose   theoretical   premise  was   that  women’s   endless   suffering  was   caused   by   their  
physiological   inferiority  and  impurity.  The  only  way  out  for   them  was  to  convert   to  
the  Pure  Land  Buddhism.  It  required  such  feasible  practices  as  paying  homage  to  the  
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“three   jewels”   (Buddha-­‐‑Dharma-­‐‑Sangha),   feeding   monks,   giving   alms,   building  
bridges,   repairing   roads,   helping   the   poor,   and   the   like.   Based   on   rudimentary  
Buddhist   teachings,   such   a   belief   had   become   popular   among   common   people,  
particularly   middle-­‐‑   and   lower-­‐‑class   women.70  In   her   previous   life,   Liu   Xiang   is   a  
young   woman   of   Hunan   origin   who   refuses   marriage.   She   practices   Buddhism   at  
home,  and  gets  a  Buddhist  name  “Shanguo,”  (“good  result”).  Shanguo  is  reincarnated  
as  Liu  Xiang,  whose  husband  is  the  Number  One  Scholar  in  the  imperial  examination.  
Liu   Xiang   also   chants   Buddhist   sutra,   abstains   from   eating   meat,   and   persuades  
people  to  perform  good  deeds.  Eventually,  she  attains  the  highest  status   in  the  Pure  
Land  after  dying  in  the  company  of  her  family.    
Zhou  observed   that  Liu  Xiang  had  become   the   role  model   for  women   suffering  
though  miserable   lives.   One   such   case  was   a   tragedy   reported   in   his   hometown   of  
Shaoxing,   Zhejiang.   The   report   told   of   a   young   woman   whose   favorite   book   was  
Precious  Scrolls   on   Liu   Xiang,   and   how   she   had,   committed   suicide   to   resist   an  
arranged  marriage.  Zhou  was  appalled  by  such  news  because  it  reminded  him  of  the  
exact   kinds   of  misfortunes   that   had  happened   in   the   past.  Although   his   hometown  
had   been   rapidly   modernizing   and   losing   its   traditional   aura,   the   old   and  
“insignificant”  misfortunes  in  peoples’  everyday  life  kept  recurring.  In  his  experience,  
all  such  young  women  refused  marriage.  “Regarding  the  baojuan  as  the  Classics  and  
History,  and  the  Buddhist  nunnery  as  their  destination,”  they  devoted  themselves  to  
Buddhist  practices  and  often  died  young  from  depression.71  Buddhism  impressed  the  
general  public  as  helping  those  women  by  giving  them  an   imaginary  sense  of  hope,  
yet  Zhou  disagreed,  arguing  that  what  hope  they  got  was  only  for  relief  in  the  life  to  
come.  Based  on  a  premise  of  women’s  physical  inferiority,  this  Buddhist  teaching  was  
not  only  inherently  repressive  and  violent,  but  also  left  no  room  for  women  to  initiate  
any  change  in  their  earthly  lives.72  
            Seeking   a   universal   interpretation   for   the   genealogy   of   religious   violence,   Zhou  
further  turned  to  “savage  cultures,”  relying  on  the  works  of  Freud  and  James  Frazer  
to  explore  the  origin  of  taboos  on  women.  He  concluded  that  on  a  superficial  level,  the  
resentment  borne  against  women  in  labor  or  having  a  menstrual  period  arose  because  
of  those  women’s  filthiness  and  the  power  to  contaminate.  The  hidden  reason  was,  in  
fact,  people’s  fear  of  the  mystic  power  of  the  god  of  birth  and  life.73  In  the  savage  time  
he  imagined,  women  were  believed  to  have  enormous  mystic  power.  Both  the  power  
wielded   by   prehistoric   women   and   the   social   sanctions   placed   upon   them   did   not  
bear  any  implication  of  moral  bias.  Women’s  impurity  and  the  sages’  sacredness  were  
all  different  manifestations  of   the  same  mystic  power,  which  was  similar   to  morally  
neutral  physical  forces.  Containment  was  needed  because  such  forces  could  possibly  
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injure  women   themselves  or  anything   they   touched.  What  exacerbated   the   situation  
was  this  later  development:  
  
As   culture   progressed,   the   sages   gradually   eliminated   the   restraints   imposed   on  
them  and  retained  their  sacredness,  whereas  women  were  not  so  fortunate  and  they  
still   had   to   be   constrained.   With   time,   people’s   feeling   of   mystery   about   them  
became   the   feeling   of   impurity,   and   fear   became  detestation.   This   is   the   universal  
misfortune   of   women   from   all   over   the   world.   It   is   not   limited   to   one   particular  
location,  and  China  is  simply  part  of  it.74    
  
Zhou’s  anthropological  reconstruction  of  women’s  history  left  unexplained  why  only  
the  sages  managed  to  keep  their  power  while  women  failed  to  do  so.  His  purpose  was,  
however,  to  rationalize  the  origin  of  myths  that  sanctioned  the  use  of  violence  against  
women,  and  the  ways  that  such  violence  became  self-­‐‑inflicted.  Seen  in  the  context  of  
the   Chinese   Enlightenment,   Zhou’s   interpretation   differed   significantly   from   the  
popular   theories   that   emphasized   socioeconomic   causes   for   women’s   suffering.75  
Highlighting   the   religious   root  of  discrimination  against  women,  he  warned  against  
the  blind  optimism  about  women’s  liberation  that  resulted  from  radical  social  reforms,  
none  of  which  would  eradicate  violence  against  women   in  everyday  life  unless  they  
touched  upon  its  time-­‐‑honored  religious  biases.  
  
Intellectuals as the Advocates of Violence  
 
Zhou  was   disappointed   by  modern   education   because   it   produced   not   rational  
individuals,   but   tyrannical   masses   with   only   a   veneer   of   education.   In   1924,   a  
university  professor  involved  in  a  scandal  by  writing  love  letters  to  a  female  student.  
Reading  the  fliers  the  protesting  students  circulated,  Zhou  sensed  a  deeply  intolerant  
nature,   and   criticized   the   “Pharisaic   atmosphere”   among   the   educated   population.  
They  were  eager  to  subject  the  professor  to  immediate  public  humiliation.  From  this  
he  learned  that  the  majority  could  not  be  trusted.  The  lesson  led  him  to  argue  that  a  
civilized  society   to  be  one  with  minimal   social   sanctions,  whose  members  were   free  
from  the  masses’  surveillance.76  Such  liberal  hopes  were  dashed  by  the  ineffectiveness  
of   educated   members   of   the   cultural   elite,   who   were   supposed   to   enlighten   the  
uneducated  population.  If  these  young  college  students  represented  the  future,  there  
would  be  no  future  at  all.    
 
74  Zhou,  “Taboos  on  Women,”  451.  
75  For  example,   in  discussing  the  fate  of  Nora,   the  character  who  escapes  from  her  oppressive  
family  in  Ibsen’s  A  Doll’s  House,  Lu  Xun  emphasizes  the  importance  of  economic  independence  
in  order   for  women   to  be   truly   emancipated.   See  Lu  Xun,   “What  Happens   after  Nora  Leaves  
Home?”  娜拉走后怎样,  Complete  Works  vol.1,  165-­‐‑73.  
76  Zhou,  “A  Letter  against  the  New  Culture”  一封反对新文化的信,  Collected  Essays  vol.3,  406-­‐‑8;  
“Correspondence  from  Baodugu”  抱犊谷通信,  Collected  Essays  vol.4,  42-­‐‑6.  
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To   Zhou,   the   problem  with   the  mainstream   Enlightenment   was   that   it   did   not  
have   qualified   enlighteners.   Its   fanatic   character   and   inherently   violent   tendency  
could  all  be  attributed  to  activist  intellectuals,  who  were  inclined  to  resort  to  violence  
in  resolving  conflicts.  They  took  violent  action  in  the  name  of  promoting  democracy  
and  science.  The  White  Terror  was  a  traumatic  event,  but  more  traumatic  was  the  fact  
that   some   important   figures   in   the   Enlightenment,   including   Cai   Yuanpei  蔡元培  
(1868-­‐‑1940),   Hu   Shi   and   Wu   Zhihui,   endorsed   the   KMT’s   cleansing   of   the  
Communists   and  were   blind   to   the   systematic  massacres   that   ensued.77  Seeing   their  
decision   as   betraying   not   only   the   Enlightenment   spirit,   but   also   the   human  
conscience,   Zhou   harshly   criticized   them   for   ignoring   the   value   of   human   life.78  He  
commented:  “The  strangest  thing  is  that  the  intellectual  Wu  Zhihui  suddenly  became  
a  maniac  killer.  Also  as  intellectuals,  Hu  and  Cai  even  totally  ignored  the  event  when  
they   stayed   in   Shanghai.”79  It   was   ridiculous   to   him   that   Hu   had   the   leisure   to  
comment  on  the  existence  of  the  rickshaw  as  a  proof  of  China’s  being  “uncivilized,”  
when  beheading  was   still  widely  being  practiced   in   the  massacre.80  Observing  what  
happened   with   Hu   made   Zhou   desperate:   if   the   most   educated   and   liberal  
intellectuals   came   to   support   the   most   brutal   intellectual   persecution,   the  
Enlightenment  project  they  endorsed  would  lose  its  appeal.    
            Zhou   gave   up   his   ground   for   engaging   in   the   social  movements   because   of   his  
zero-­‐‑tolerance   policy   toward   violence.   He   neither   engaged   in   such  movements   nor  
continued  to  criticize  his  peers  publicly,  at  least  from  the  1930s  onward.  He  turned  to  
explore   the   roles   the   Ming-­‐‑Qing   literati   played,   on   the   premise   that   modern  
intellectuals  were  nothing  but   the   reincarnation  of   these  historical  “ghosts.”   In  1937,  
he   traced   the   genealogy   of   the   literati’s   active   participation   in   violence   back   to  
Confucius,   who,   as   the   Minister   of   Justice   in   the   State   of   Lu,   executed   scholar  
Shaozheng  Mao  少正卯.  Confucius  ordered  Shaozheng’s  execution  not   for  his  actual  
crime,   but   for   his   rebellious   attitude,   his   maverick   posturing   and   his   pretentious  
manner  of  speech.81  Zhou  found  that  this  case  became  the  model  for  later  generations  
of  literati,  who  were  inclined  to  treat  people  just  as  they  had  treated  Shaozheng  Mao  
 
77  Cai   opposed   the   Communist   Party   for   its  mobilizing   peasants   and  workers.   He   chaired   a  
KMT   committee   on   cleansing   its   members   from   the   KMT,   and   thus   paved   the   way   for   the  
widespread  massacre  of  Communists.  However,  he  was  against  such  killing  itself.  His  speeches  
and   articles   related   to   his   anti-­‐‑Communist   attitude   (1927-­‐‑1931)   were   not   included   in   his  
Collected  Works.   For   a   detailed   account,   see   Zhou   Tiandu,   Biography   of  Cai   Yuanpei  蔡元培传  
(Beijing:  Renmin  chubanshe,  1984),  256-­‐‑267.  The  biography  also  touches  upon  how  Wu  Zhihui  
participated   in   the   event.   Yang   Tianshi   further   explored   Wu’s   motives   for   proposing   the  
cleansing.  See  his  “Wu  Zhihui  before  the  April  12  Coup”  四一二政变前夕的吴稚晖,  Lishi  Yanjiu  
6  (2003):  170-­‐‑8.  
78  Qian,  21  Lectures  on  Zhou  Zuoren,  178.  
79  Zhou,  “How  Should  It  Be  Discussed,”  320.    
80  Zhou,  “Rickshaw  and  Beheading”  人力车与斩决,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  256-­‐‑7.    
81  Zhou,  “On  Literary  Inquisition”  谈文字狱,  Collected  Essays  vol.7,  667-­‐‑8.  
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and  thought  it  just  to  kill  them  in  a  dispute.  To  the  literati,  both  dissent  and  the  people  
expressing  it  deserved  to  be  eliminated.82    
In  the  1930s  and  1940s,  Zhou  often  appreciated  the  rational  humanism  at  the  heart  
of   Confucianism,   and   he   used   Confucian   terms   to   scorn   the   fanatic   and   violent  
moderns.   Nevertheless,   bringing   up   Confucius’s   role   as   the   initiator   of   intellectual  
persecution,  Zhou  noticed  the  inherent  contradiction  and  complexity  of  the  Confucian  
ideas  in  practice.  Therefore,  what  Kiyama  noted  as  the  “continuity”  in  Zhou’s  writing,  
his   abhorrence   of   intellectual’s   “corruption   and   hypocrisy,” 83   could   be   further  
qualified:   it  was   corrupted  by   the   surrender   to   irrationality.   It  was  also  hypocritical  
for  resorting  to  violence  while  mouthing  and  miming  an  ethos  of  non-­‐‑violence.  
            The  literati’s  violent  handling  of  disagreement  convinced  Zhou  that  violence  had  
become  embedded  in  their  mode  of  thought.  The  fixed  tendency  toward  violence  was  
best   demonstrated   in   the   historical   commentaries史论   they   favored.   Zhou   thought  
historical  commentaries  not  only  failed  to  help  people  understand  historical  truth,  but  
also  encouraged  an  arbitrary  way  of  thinking.  As  he  wrote  in  1939,  “It  is  not  just  that  
the  details  of  the  events  of  hundreds  and  thousands  years  ago  cannot  be  known  to  us,  
so  that  it  is  inappropriate  to  pass  judgment.  What  is  more  horrible  is  the  fact  that  such  
writings  will   cultivate   an   attitude   to   judge   others   hastily   and  harshly.   This   is   not   a  
trivial   matter.”84  Here   Zhou   touches   on   two   issues:   epistemology   and   sociopolitics.  
The   former   issue   concerns   whether   historical   truth   can   be   reached;   Zhou’s   answer  
was   negative.   The   latter   issue,   more   relevant   in   reality,   was   about   the   disastrous  
consequences   of   the   contemporary   attitude   of   harsh   judgment,   which   might   be  
applied   to   other   areas.   Zhou   observed   that,   relying   only   on   narrow,   doctrinally  
applied  Confucianism,  members  of   this  class  could  make  their  knowledge  lethal―  a  
process   the   Qing   scholar   Dai   Zhen  戴震   (1724-­‐‑1777)   called   “killing  with   Confucian  
principles”  以理杀人.85  In   the   midst   of   such   a   contaminated   intellectual   climate,   he  
concluded  that  elite  support  for  the  persecution  of  intellectuals  could  not  be  avoided.  
Dai’s   terminology   anticipated   the   criticism   of   the   cannibalistic   nature   of   the  
Confucianism  made  by  Wu  Yu  and  Lu  Xun.  When  modern  writers  would  often  make  
use  of  cannibalism  as  a  metaphor.  Zhou  would  home  in  on  the  brutal  specifics  of  the  
act.   He   thereby   kept   readers   keenly   aware   of   the   mutilation,   wounding   and  
dismemberment  it  entailed.  
Zhou   tried   to   prove   that   the   literati   often   colluded  with   political   authorities   in  
upholding   the   social   and   ideological   order.   In   discussing   family   issues   in   1936,   he  
mentioned  a  criminal  case  that  allegedly  occurred  in  the  year  1788:  Under  the  order  of  
Emperor  Qianlong,  who  promoted  filial  piety,  a  couple  was  skinned  alive  in  front  of  
their  mother  and  a  crowd  of  spectators  for  neglecting  their  mother’s  needs.  Zhou  did  
 
82  Zhou,  “Liweng  and  Suiyuan”笠翁与随园,  Collected  Essays  vol.6,  753.  
83  Kiyama Hideo, Theses on Modern Chinese Literary Thoughts 文学复古与文学革命, trans. 
& ed. Zhao Jinghua (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2004), 88.  
84  Zhou,  “Jotting  Notes  of  Xiangzu”  香祖笔记,  Collected  Essays  vol.8,  228-­‐‑9.  
85  Ibid.  
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not   focus   on   the   disturbing,   multilayered   dynamic   between   the   executed,   the  
spectators   (including   the   mother),   and   the   Emperor   who   endorsed   the   execution.  
Rather,  he   suggested   that   the   story  might  have  been   fabricated  by   some  member  of  
the  literati.  He  raises  the  possibility  that  the  edict  from  which  the  story  is  drawn  may  
have  been  a  forgery.  Tactics  like  these,   if  they  were  used,  would  reveal  the  standard  
mindset  of  that  age’s  literary  intellectual.  For  him,  it  would  indeed  be  appropriate  that  
one  be  skinned  alive  for  shirking  the  duties  imposed  by  the  tradition  of  filial  piety.86  
These   literati,  who   themselves  might   be   punished   violently   for   their   behavior  were  
also   voluntarily   initiated   or   participated   in   violence. Such   observations   belied   the  
general  public’s   impression   that   traditional  elites  opposed  using  violence.  However,  
Haar   gives   them   credence,   casting   the   elite’s   supposed   taste   for  mere   depictions   of  
violence  as  an  ideological  construct.  In  reality,  he  writes,  “they  had  no  compunctions  
in  using  violence  to  maintain  control.”87  
The  death  of  the  controversial  Ming  thinker  Li  Zhi  李贽  (1527-­‐‑1602),  exemplified  
how   widely   literati   supported   the   persecution   of   others   for   defending   their   own  
beliefs,  and  how  Confucian  principles   functioned  as  a  death  warrant   in   their  hands.  
Zhou  regarded  the  case  as  a  significant  event  in  Chinese  cultural  history.88  He  argued  
that   Li,   the  most   reckless   attacker   of  Neo-­‐‑Confucian   teachings,  was   among   the   few  
intellectuals   who   could   be   dubbed   a   “rationalist”   in   the   whole   of   Chinese   history.  
Living  in  a  “highly  stylized  society  wherein  the  roles  of  individuals  were  thoroughly  
restricted  by  a  body  of  simple  yet  ill-­‐‑defined  moral  precepts,”89  Li  had  been  regarded  
as  a  heretic.  His  contempt  for  family  duties,  his  contact  with  Buddhism,  Daoism,  his  
familiarity   with   Catholicism   and   his   acquaintance   with   Wang   Yangming’s  王阳明  
(1472-­‐‑1529)  School  of  the  Mind心学  gave  him  a  broader  view  of  his  culture  than  those  
under  the  influence  of  state-­‐‑endorsed  Neo-­‐‑Confucianism.  But  to  Zhou  it  was  exactly  
Li’s  profound  understanding  of  “the  principles  of   things  and  human  emotions”  that  
made  him  the  public  enemy  of  the  orthodox  literati:  “His  conclusions  are  all  common-­‐‑
sensual  and  truthful.  There  is  nothing  new  under  the  sun.  However,  the  shallow  and  
pedantic   literati   were   still   shocked   by   the   common   sense   he   offered.   They   thought  
that  Li  was  either  a  demon  or  a  monster.  They  had  to  wage  a  war  against  him.”90  Li  
was   imprisoned  for  “deviating  from  the  norm  and  misleading  the  people,”  and  was  
eventually  driven  to  suicide.  To  make  matters  worse,  the  scorn  academics  held  Li   in  
outlived   the  man  himself.      Subsequent   scholars,   including  Gu  Yanwu  顾炎武   (1613-­‐‑
1682),   also   harshly   attacked   him.   Zhou   thought   Gu,   despite   all   his   patriotism   and  
relevance   to  post-­‐‑Qing  nationalist  discourses,   incapable  of   independent   thought.  He  
only   followed   conventional   thinking,   and   thus   came   to   support   literary   inquisitions  
 
86  Zhou,  “Proximity  of  the  Issues  on  Family”  家之上下四旁,  Collected  Essays  vol.7,  419-­‐‑20.  
87  Haar,  “Rethinking  ‘Violence’,”  138.  
88  Zhou,  “On  Last  Will”  关于遗令 Collected  Essays  vol.9,  641.  
89  Ray   Huang,   1587,   a   Year   of   No   Significance:   the   Ming   Dynasty   in   Decline   (New   Haven   and  
Landon:  Yale  University  Press,  1981),  221.  
90  Zhou,  “On  Literary  Inquisition,”  674.  
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and   book   burning   in   defense   of   Confucian   principles. 91   Here   Zhou   implies   a  
devastating  critique:  Gu  had  attained  the  highest  possible  scholarly  achievement,  but  
it   had   not   endowed   him   the   bare  minimum   of   empathy   one   should   expect   from   a  
human.  
The  “eccentric  model  official” 92    Hai  Rui  海瑞  (1514-­‐‑1587),  formed  Li  Zhi’s  mirror  
image,  according  to  Zhou.  Hai  Rui  represented  justice,  courage,  and  moral  cleanliness  
in  the  popular  imagination. However,  as  Zhou  commented  in  1938,  what  Hai  Rui  did  
often   outraged   basic   human   decency.   This   “model   official”   was   nothing   but   “a  
merciless   official   who   achieved   fame   by   chance,   and   for   that   reason,   he   is   more  
fearful.”  What  made  him  so  fearful  was  his  zeal  for  strict  ideological  conformity  and  
his  willingness  to  use  harsh  measures  in  its  defense.  His  seal  was  engraved  with  the  
text  “the  officer  who  is  in  charge  of  “morals  and  manners”  风化.  Zhou  said  it  “depicts  
the   truth  about  his  mind.”  To  Zhou,   the  phrase   about  morals   and  manners   implied  
that  Hai  Rui  baselessly  assumed  the  authority  to  interfere  violently  in  people’s  lives,  
which  was  exactly  what  Dai  Zhen  called  “killing  with  Confucian  principles.”  In  notes  
jotted  by  the  late  Ming  scholar  Yao  Shuxiang’s  姚叔祥   (?-­‐‑?),  Zhou  found  evidence  to  
support  his  charge:  
 
Hai Rui had a five-year-old daughter. Once, while eating a cookie, she was asked by 
his father where she got it. Upon learning that it was from a boy servant, Hai Rui 
became angry: “How come a girl accepts cookies from a boy servant? This is not 
what my daughter is supposed to do. Go ahead and starve to death.” The girl then 
cried and stopped eating. Refusing other family members’ exhortations to eat, she 
died seven days later.93 
  
In  this  story,  Hai  Rui  obviously  went  to  an  extreme,  applying  the  Confucian  stricture  
against  mingling  between  male  and  female  adults  to  a  mere  child.  His  failure  to  make  
this  elementary  distinction  led  directly  to  his  daughter’s  death.  Naturally,  his  decision  
shocked  Zhou.  What  shocked  him  even  more  was  how  highly  it  was  praised  by  both  
authors  who   recorded   it.  Approvingly,   these   scholars   remarked   that   “only  Hai   Rui  
could   have   such   a   daughter.”   Zhou   was   scandalized.   “I   feel   the   chill   on   my   back  
when   I   read   this,”   he   wrote.   “I   do   not   understand   those   of   later   generations   who  
agreed  with  him.  They  are  inferior  to  beasts  according  to  the  law  of  nature.”94  With  a  
mere  anecdote,  Zhou  seemed  to  have  devastated  Hai  Rui’s  moral  reputation.  
Although  Zhou’s  method  may  not   be   “scientifically”   reliable   as research  on   the  
educated  class  as  a  whole,  it  provides  a  little-­‐‑seen  perspective—one  that  draws  on  the  
insignificant   records from unofficial histories to seek out historical truths.   In   the   cases  
discussed   above,   what   he   always   underlined   was   how   pandemic   the   orientation  
toward  violence  was  among  the  intellectual  class,  no  matter  what  age  they  belonged  
 
91  Zhou,  “Smile  of  Women”  妇人之笑,  Collected  Essays  vol.7,  409-­‐‑10.  
92  Huang,  a  Year  of  No  Significance,  130-­‐‑55.  
93  Zhou,  “On  the  Text  of  Hai  Rui’s  Seal”  记海瑞印文,  Collected  Essays  vol.8,  70-­‐‑1.      
94  Ibid.  
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to.   As   they   blindly   followed   unexamined   doctrines,   their   social   and   intellectual  
engagement  could  produce  nothing  but  disaster.  They  neglected  the  value  of  human  
life,   and  were   thus   not   qualified   as   enlighteners   at   all.   Sure   of   the   impossibility   of  
reform,  Zhou  gave  up  his   hope   for   an  Enlightenment  project   led  by   the   intellectual  
class,  and  resolved  to  carry  out  one  of  his  own.  
 
The Masses as the Agents of Violence 
 
The   impossibility  of   the  Enlightenment  project  was  ultimately  determined  by   its  
audience,  the  masses  supposedly  waiting  to  be  enlightened.  It  was  not  difficult  to  find  
negative  attitudes  toward  the  masses  among  the  Enlightenment  thinkers  in  the  1920s.  
Besides   Zhou,   Hu   Shi,   Lu   Xun,   and   Chen   Duxiu  陈独秀   (1879-­‐‑1942)   all   at   times  
regarded  “the  masses”  as   irrational  and  passive.  As  Lu  Xun  wrote   in  1923   that  “the  
masses,   especially   those   of   China,   are   always   on-­‐‑lookers   to   the   ongoing   drama,”95  
indicating  that  they  had  no  agency  in  shaping  the  history  events.  The  Zhou  brothers  
both  realized   the  awkward  circumstance   that  met  proponents  of   the  Enlightenment:  
there  was  no  qualified  “audience”  to  enlighten.  Commenting  on  the  1925  nationwide  
anti-­‐‑imperialist  movement   triggered   by   the   “May   30th   Incident,”  Hu   Shi   expressed  
his  distrust  of  mass  movements,  dismissing  them  as  emotionally  charged  and  fruitless.  
The  key   to   solving   the  problems  of  China  was   instead   a   good  government.96  As  Lu  
Xun   would,   many   others   changed   their   negative   views   in   the   post-­‐‑Enlightenment  
years.   For   Zhou,   however,   the   hope   of   broad-­‐‑based   social   enlightenment   never  
existed.97  
For   his   negative   view   of   the   masses,   Zhou   was   indebted   to   the   French   social  
psychologist  Gustave  Le  Bon   (1841-­‐‑1931),  whose  works   had   attracted  him   since   the  
late   1910s.98  When   he   discussed   the   ineffectiveness   of   propaganda   in   1921,   he   cited  
Bertrand   Russell   (1872~1970)   and   Le   Bon   to   argue   that   “it   was   difficult   for   the  
psychology  of  the  crowd  to  change.  It  would  take  them  half  a  century  to  accept  even  
the  pure   scientific   truth,   such  as  William  Harvey’s   theory  of  blood   circulation,   even  
though  it  had  nothing  to  do  with  their  existing  religious  or  ethical  beliefs.”99  In  1923,  
such  negative  estimates  led  him  to  conclude  that  “the  power  of  thought  is  weak  over  
the  masses.”  One  example  of   its  weakness  could  be  found  in  Buddhism,  which  after  
 
95  Lu  Xun,  “What  Happens  after  Nora  Leaves  Home?”  170.  
96 Hu  Shi,  “Patriotic  Movement  and  Pursuing  Education”  爱国运动与求学,  Complete  Works  of  Hu  
Shi胡适全集  (Beijing:  Beijing  daxue  chubanshe,  1998),  vol.4,  628.  
97  Qian,  21  Lectures  on  Zhou  Zuoren,  71-­‐‑2.  
98  Zhou,   “A  Substitute   for  Express  Mail”  代快邮,  Collected  Essays  vol.4,   254-­‐‑5.   Le  Bon’s  works  
include  The  Psychology  of  Peoples  and  The  Crowd:  a  Study  of  the  Popular  Mind.  
99  Zhou,  “Propaganda”  宣传,  Collected  Essays  vol.2,  375-­‐‑6.  Russell  was   invited   to  China  by  Cai  
Yuanpei   from   1920   to   1921   to   give   lectures   on   philosophy,   sociology,   and   China’s  
modernization.  Ha  Yingfei   argues   that  Zhou’s   religious  view  was  also   influenced  by  Russell.  
See  “Russell’s  Influence  on  Zhou  Zuoren’s  Dismissal  of  Religion”  罗素对周作人”非宗教”思想的
影响,  Guangdong  shehui  kexue  1(2008):  146-­‐‑51.    
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coming  to  China   for  about   two  millennia  had   left  no   trace  of   its  humanistic  concern  
but   only   fetishistic   beliefs   in   people’s   consciousness. 100   In   1924,   he   eventually  
admitted  the  unfeasibility  of  a  mass-­‐‑movement  style  Enlightenment:  “There  had  been  
Socrates   in  Greece,  Shakyamuni  in  India,  and  Confucius  in  China.  Revered  as  sages,  
however,   they   seemed   to   have   never   entered   into   the  mind   of   their   fellow   citizens.  
Their   teaching  could  only  be  appreciated  by   the   few  clear-­‐‑minded  rationalists.”  The  
masses   were   thus   too   mired   in   inertia   to   move   forward.   All   endeavors   including  
sermons,   indoctrination,   and   propaganda   would   fail   because   of   this.101  In   1925,   he  
further  indicated  that  the  unwise  majority  represented  the  lowest  developmental  level  
of   a   culture:   In   this   supposedly  modern   society,   their  minds  were   still   occupied   by  
such  savage  beliefs  as  foot  fetishism.102    
Zhou  regarded  the  masses  as  tyrannical  as  well  as  submissive,  and  therefore  not  
to  be  elevated  as  the  “sacred”  judge  of  truth.  In  discussing  the  value  of  poetry  in  1922,  
he  argued  that  it  “could  not  be  determined  by  a  majority  rule  even  if  they  understand  
its   significance.   Unifying   the   thought   of   people   with   the   ideas   of   a   single   dictator  
should   be   objected   to,   and   doing   so   around   the   will   of   the   masses   should   also   be  
objected  to.”103  It  was  totally  unreasonable  for  those  who  believed  in  majority  rule  to  
celebrate   the   chaotic   chorus   of   the  masses   at   the   price   of   drowning   out   individual  
opinions,   feelings  of   joy  and  pain.  As  he  wrote   in  1925,  “the  autocracy  by  one   ruler  
and  the  autocracy  by  the  majority  are  all  autocracy.”104  With  the  mass  movements  of  
the  late  1920s  looming  large,  he  expressed  his  strong  abhorrence:  
 
The masses are still the popular icon. Everything done on behalf of them is the same 
as what has been done following the Mandate of Heaven in ancient times. Even 
those social reformers have a wholehearted simple faith in them. To these reformers 
the masses are the embodiment of the truth and justice, and their undertakings thus 
become the crusade blessed by God. How ridiculous! I do not trust the masses 
insofar as they are just a mixture of the tyrant and the abjectly obedient citizen.105   
  
Such   comments   reflected   his   deep   fear   of   and   elitist   contempt   for   modern   social  
movements   that  depended  on  mass  mobilization.   In   the  same  year,  he  declared  that  
he  denied   the   legitimacy  of  “all   the  movements  and  doctrines   that  are  based  on   the  
faith   in   the   masses,”   and   regarded   them   as   simply   “untenable.”106  With   his   firm  
attitude,   Zhou   distinguished   himself   from   some   other   mainstream   thinkers   who  
might  have  also  criticized  the  masses  as  a  whole,  but  still  eventually  joined  them.  
 
100  Zhou,  “‘The  Giant-­‐‑Killer’  and  Other  Issues”  “大人之危害”及其他,  Collected  Essays  vol.3,  404.  
101  Zhou,  “The  Ineffectiveness  of  Indoctrination”  教训之无用,  Collected  Essays  vol.3,  356.  
102  Zhou,  “On  Foot  Fetishism”  拜脚商兑,  Collected  Essays  vol.4,  116-­‐‑9.  
103  Zhou,  “The  Use  of  Poetry”  诗的效用,  Collected  Essays  vol.2,  524.  
104  Zhou,  “About  ‘Talks  on  The  Classic  of  Poetry’”  谈谈谈诗经,  Collected  Essays  vol.4,  375.  
105  Zhou,   “Correspondence   from   Beigouyan”  北沟沿通信,   Talk   about   Tigers谈虎集   (Shanghai:  
Beixin  shuju,  1929),  274-­‐‑5.      
106  Ibid.  
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          Zhou  traced  the  origin  of  the  modern  mass  movement  back  to  the  May  Fourth  era,  
complaining   that   since   that   time   “mass  movements   and   social   sanctions   have   been  
highly  promoted,  and  it  has  become  even  worse  today.”107  It  was  the  “social  activists”  
(intellectuals)   who   were   to   blame   for   sanctifying   the   masses:   “Modern   social  
movements   are,   of   course,   scientifically   founded,   yet   many   social   activists  
romantically  idealize  the  masses.  They  are  actually  exerting  their  own  agenda  in  the  
name  of  the  masses.  This  is  not  different  from  doing  so  in  the  name  of  God.  Perhaps  
doing   so   is   unavoidable   in   these   religiously-­‐‑infused   undertakings.” 108   Defining  
“modern  social  movements,”―a  phrase  that,  in  the  1920s,  often  veiled  a  reference  to  
Communism—as   both   “scientifically   founded”   and   “religiously-­‐‑infused,”   Zhou  
expressed   his   disapproval   artistically.   Here,   the   masses   were   portrayed   as   totally  
subject  to  the  manipulation  of  the  elite  as  a  populist  tool.  They  had  to  be  mobilized  by  
the  elite  to  become  a  social  force.  But  this  was  not  the  worst  scenario  to  him.    
As   a   social   force,   the  masses   often   exercised   their   power   in   a   violent  way   and  
thus   became   the   very   agents   of   large-­‐‑scale   practice   violence.   Zhou   expressed   his  
apprehension   as   early   as   in   1919   in   his   poem   “The   Stream,”  which   depicts   a   once-­‐‑
quiet   stream   being   intercepted   by   a   dam:   the   accumulated  water   floods   everything  
once   it  overwhelms   its  banks.  The  poem  allegorized   the   irrational  and  violent  ways  
that   the  masses   exercised   their   power.109  In   1923,   he   described   the   destiny   of   those  
who  promoted  a  revolution  of  thought  with  a  comparison  to  politicians:  
 
Those who engage in a political movement can benefit from it if they succeed. Their 
comrades would be grateful for what they have done and protect them even if they 
fail. Only the proponents of the revolution of thought are lonely travelers. They have 
only three or five companions, crying in the wild, either [doing so] in vain or getting 
beaten up for waking up people from their deep sleep. The Nationalists could win 
trust from Sun Yat-sen, 110 and the political cult in Tianjin could be appreciated by the 
warlord Cao Kun, although they both have enemies. As for the intellectual reformers, 
they will be repudiated by both sides. Cao wants to beat them, and Sun might want 
to condemn them too. Even the commoners who sacrifice under the control of the 
old thoughts also want to punish them harshly for their being heretical and 
deviating from orthodoxy.111  
  
 
107  Zhou,  “A  Letter  against  the  New  Culture,”  407-­‐‑8.  
108  Zhou,  “Firecracker”  爆竹,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  349.    
109  Qian,  Biography  of  Zhou  Zuoren,  218.  
110  Zhou   mentioned   Sun   Yat-­‐‑sen   as   a   representative   of   the   “new”   social   forces.   In   other  
occasions,  he  highly  valued  Sun   for  his   revolutionary  activities  and  regarded  him  as  a   lonely  
reformer  who  became  the  victim  of   the  masses’  resentment.   In  memorializing  Sun  in  1925,  he  
wrote,   “In   the   past,   when   Jesus   intended   to   promote   a   spiritual   revolution,   he   was   finally  
crucified  by  the  Roman  governor  who  was  forced  to  do  so  by  the  Jewish  people.  It  is  natural  for  
Mr.  Sun  to  be  hated  by  the  masses  in  China  where  people  are  used  to  being  slaves.”  See  his  “Dr.  
Sun  Yat-­‐‑sen”  孙中山先生,  Collected  Essays  vol.4,  103-­‐‑4.  
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The  phrase  “crying  in  the  wild”  reminds  us  of  the  same  expression  in  the  Bible  (Isaiah  
40.3).  The  metaphor  of  people  being  awakened  from  deep  sleep  also  reminds  us  of  the  
famous   metaphor   Lu   Xun   used.112  Both   images   highlighted   the   lonely   and   risky  
situation   of   the   would-­‐‑be   prophet   or   agent   of   enlightenment.   In   the   picture   Zhou  
draws,  the  reactionary  warlords,  the  revolutionaries  and  the  commoners  all  regard  the  
proponents   of   intellectual   revolution   as   their   enemy   and   violently   respond   to   their  
proposals.    
Zhou   argued   that   it   was   the   inertness   of   the   masses   that   justified   the   use   of  
violence   toward   any   heterodox   thoughts.   He   observed   that   in   addition   to   the  
intellectuals’  collaboration,  it  was  the  active  participation  of  the  masses  that  sustained  
the  everlasting  biases  and  violence  against  the  victims  in  the  intellectual  persecutions:  
“If   people   get   killed   for   their   thought   and   belief,   the   charges   against   them   are   as  
follows:   being  heretical   and  deviating   from   the  orthodox   teaching,   or  profaning   the  
sacred  and  the  social  and  ideological  norms.  Such  charges  even  made  the  commoners  
feel   offended.   Therefore,   not   only   the   tyrant,   but   also   the   mobs   want   to   kill   the  
heretics.”113  In  this  1937  essay,  Zhou  implied  that  the  masses  were  the  main  culprits in 
sustaining, if not initiating intellectual persecutions, which to him were similar to the 
European   Inquisition.   In   the   process,   linguistic   manipulation   played   a   crucial   role:  
through  associating  the  specific  charges  with  the  sanctified  ideology,  the  victims  were  
transformed  into  the  enemies  of  the  public.  Zhou  was  aware  that   the  power  of  belief  
was  so  strong  that  the  case  could  not  be  reconsidered  as  long  as  the  specific  doctrines  
were  still  powerful  and  popular.  “Being  killed  by  the  mobs,  there  would  be  nothing  to  
be  done.  Even  if  there  are  a  few  who  want  to  redress  such  cases,  they  themselves  are  
hated   by   the   mobs.   Their   actions   are   not   only   powerless   but   also   risky.”114  These  
comments   heralded   Zhou’s   ambition   to   challenge   the   time-­‐‑honored   popular   beliefs  
during  the  1930s  and  1940s,  when  many  historical  figures  were  promoted  as  patriotic  
heroes  in  the  heated  atmosphere  of  nationalism.    
One  such  case  Zhou  challenged  was  that  of  the  Song  official  Qin  Gui  秦桧  (1090-­‐‑
1155).  Being  demonized  in  public  memory  for  seeking  an  armistice  with  the  Jurchens  
and  for  murdering  General  Yue  Fei  岳飞  (1103-­‐‑1142),  who  was  enshrined  as  a  national  
hero   for   resisting   the   Jurchens’   invasion,  Qin  became   the  object   of  public  hatred,   as  
can  be   seen   in   the  popular  deep-­‐‑fried  dough   sticks油炸鬼   that   bear  his  name   (they  
were  associated  with  the  symbolic  action  of  deep-­‐‑frying  him).  Zhou  argued  that  Qin’s  
compromise  with  the  enemy  preserved  half  the  territory  and  people  of  the  Song,  and  
that  he   thereby  achieved  much  more   than  some  other   traitors.  Nevertheless,   he  was  
condemned   by   people   under   the   influence   of   popular   literature.   To   Zhou,   the  
unbearable  aspect  was  the  “uncivilized”  ways  of  expressing  hatred,  such  as  molding  
dough   to   represent   a   specific  person,   and   then  deep-­‐‑frying  and  eating   it.   For  Zhou,  
relying   on   poetic   justice—akin   to   using   “black   magic”   to   kill   one’s   enemy—was  
 
112  Lu  Xun,  “Preface  to  Call  to  Arms”  呐喊自序,  Complete  Works  vol.1,  437-­‐‑43.  
113  Zhou,  “On  Literary  Inquisition,”  668.  
114  Ibid.  
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cannibalistic  in  nature.115  Zhou  considered  these  arguments  as  a  pure  issue  of  freedom  
of  thought,  on  the  basis  of  which  he  could  challenge  the  biased  beliefs  dominating  the  
consciousness  of  the  masses.  Nevertheless,  as  he  already  anticipated,  such  action  was  
powerless  and  risky,  and  was  doomed  to  become  the  target  of  the  massive,  politicized  
criticism.  
  
The Split Self: Resistance and the Formation of Cultural Identity 
 
In   1934,   after   publishing   a   poem   on   his   50th   birthday   that   detailed   his   leisurely  
lifestyle,   Zhou   received  many   positive   responses   from   his   liberal   friends,   including  
Cai  Yuanpei,  Hu  Shi,  and  Shen  Yinmo  沈尹默   (1883-­‐‑1971),  but  was  also  criticized  by  
some  young  leftists  such  as  Hu  Feng胡风  (1902-­‐‑1985).  Lu  Xun  ridiculed  their  criticism,  
commenting   that   as   always,   “literati   and   beautiful   women   are   often   blamed   for   a  
country’s  ruin.”116  Conflating  gender,  class  and  state,  such  a  comment  was  uncannily  
borne  out  by  Zhou’s  life  experiences.  Women,  as  the  humiliated  and  harmed,  gained  
much   sympathy   from   Zhou.   Particularly,   the   cases   of   wartime   rape   provided   him  
with  a  gender-­‐‑specific  perspective  concerning   the   fate  of  war  survivors,  who  can  be  
regarded   as   having   been   consumed   by   symbolic   cannibalism.   Zhou   discussed   such  
phenomena  in  1926:  
  
There  are  two  destinies  for  wartime  women  (except  for  those  who  managed  to  flee):  
to  commit  suicide  for  fear  of  being  raped,  or  to  live  on  after  being  raped.  The  former  
would   be   named   as   heroic   women   (烈女 or   烈妇 ),   and   receive   numerous  
posthumous  honors.  At  least  there  will  be  a  poem  dedicated  to  them.  The  latter  will  
be  despised  for  the  rest  of  their  life,  just  as  the  “Sisters-­‐‑in-­‐‑Law  of  the  long-­‐‑haired”  长
毛嫂嫂
117  were  treated,  although  in  my  opinion  they  are  lamentable  and  respectable.  
Refusing   to   tolerate   humiliation   and   hardship   is   necessary   for   life,   but   it   is   also  
necessary  to  tolerate  humiliation  and  hardship  to  live  on.118    
  
The  women  who  died  defending  their  chastity  have  been  praised  for  exemplifying  the  
Confucian  ethical  codes,  epitomized  in  the  commonplace  maxim  “Starving  to  death  is  
a   small   matter,   but  losing   one'ʹs   chastity   is   a   great   calamity.”119  饿死事小,  失节事大.  
 
115  Zhou,  “A  Second  Essay  on  Deep-­‐‑fried  Dough  Sticks”  再谈油炸鬼,  Collected  Essays,  vol.7,  309.  
116  See   Zhang   Juxiang,   Zhang   Tierong,  A  Chronicle   of   Zhou   Zuoren’s   Life  周作人年谱   (Tianjin:  
Tianjin   renmin   chubanshe,   2000),   440-­‐‑1.  Also   see  Lu  Xun,   “To  Cao   Juren”  至曹聚仁,  Complete  
Works  vol.13,  87.    
117  It  refers  to  women  who  have  been  forced  to  stay  with  the  Taiping  Rebels.  
118  Zhou,  “Casual  Talks  (3)”  闲话四则之  (三),  The  Water-­‐‑plantain泽泻集  (Shanghai:  Beixin  shuju,  
1933),  174-­‐‑5.  Renamed  by  the  editor  Zhong  Shuhe  in  Collected  Essays  (vol.4,  559-­‐‑560)  as  “A  Chat  
on  Rape”  闲话强奸.  
119 Lan, Hua R. and Vanessa L. Fong eds, Women in Republican China: A Sourcebook (Armonk, NY: 




54   Chinese  Literature:  Essays,  Articles,  Reviews  36  (2014)  
 
 
These  “heroic  women”  committing  suicide  could   thus  be   regarded  as   the  symbol  of  
this   absurd   and   meaningless   sacrifice.   They   stood   for   the   victims   of   all   violently  
imposed  moral,  political,  ideological,  and  religious  beliefs.  However,  as  Zhou  directly  
observed   through   the   life   of   his   grandparents,120  those   who   chose   to   survive   after  
being  raped  during  war  were  unfortunate.  Though  it  was  a  privilege  to  survive  a  war,  
for   many,   survival   was   the   beginning   of   a   lifelong   experience   of   shame,   fear,   and  
misery.  They  suffered  from  a  “triple  violence”:   the  rape   itself   (the  physical  violation  
itself   and   the   post-­‐‑traumatic   memory),   and   the   more   traumatic   humiliation   from  
others  who  based  their  condemnatory  judgment  of  them  on  their  traditional  beliefs.    
            Among  his  contemporaries,  Zhou  was  not  the  only  one  who  was  concerned  with  
women’s   fate,   but   he  might   have   been   the   only   one  who   explicitly   highlighted   the  
significance   of   the   humiliated   women’s   forbearance.   He   once   joined   his   peers   to  
repudiate   the   male-­‐‑centered   regulations   on   women’s   chastity   in   the   early   1920s.121  
Such   radical   gestures   of   the  May   Fourth   intellectuals   on   gender  matters   have   been  
regarded  by  some  scholars  as  serving  the  nationalistic  cause  over   the   individualistic  
one.122  Zhou,  however,  might  not  be  a  good  case  to  prove  this  view.  He  agreed  with  
Bertrand  Russell   that   Chinese   should   be  more   patriotic,   but   had   always   prioritized  
individual   life   over   nationalistic   goals,   insisting   that   the   nation-­‐‑state   was   for  
preserving  individual  life,  not  the  other  way  around.123    
Refusing   to   reduce   the   individual   to   a  moral,   ideological   or   religious   cipher,  he  
commended   survivors   of   rape.  Enduring  humiliation   they  would  have   encountered  
on  a  daily  basis,  their  survival  itself  was  the  most  powerful  way  to  negate  the  effect  of  
symbolic  violence.  As  Shu  Wu  points  out,  Lu  Xun  also  attributed  the  cruel  treatment  
of  unchaste  women   to   the   tyranny  of  popular   belief,   and  he   condemned  how   these  
women   were   socially   “murdered”   by   the   unanimous   majority.124  For   Lu   Xun   and  
other  Marxists,  a  substantial  change  to  the  economic  system  was  the  precondition  for  
solving   these   problems.   To   Zhou,   however,   changing   people’s   thought   itself   was  
more   important.   Yet   the   radical  measures   used   in   the  Enlightenment   indicated   that  
the  new  beliefs   it  established  could  be   just  as  violent  and  tyrannical  as  the  old  ones.  
What   could   be   done,   therefore,   was   to   legitimize   the   right   to   survive   under  
humiliation:   being   raped   was   not   merely   lamentable;   surviving   under   humiliation  
 
120  Shu,  Zhou  Zuoren:  His  Merits  and  Demerits,  157.  
121  Ibid,  130.  
122  Dorothy Ko criticizes the May Fourth imagination of the all-negative oppressed image of Chinese 
women. See her Teacher of the Inner Chambers: Women and Culture in Seventeenth-Century China 
(Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1994).  Along the same line of reasoning, Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee 
further complicates the Confucian discourse on women and explores the possibility of a Confucian 
feminism. Both believe that the May Fourth generation’s attack of the sexism of Confucianism ultimately 
serve their nationalist project. See her Confucianism and Women: A   Philosophical   Interpretation  
(Albany:  SUNY  Press,  2007).  
123  Zhou, “Two Opinions on Theater” 对于戏剧的两条意见, Collected Essays 2, 617.  
124  Shu,  Zhou  Zuoren:  His  Merits  and  Demerits,  378-­‐‑80.  
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was   even   respectable,   in   that   it   required   more   courage   than   simply   committing  
suicide.  The  best  resistance  is  survival.    
Such  a  view  represented  Zhou’s  attitude   towards   resistance   in  general.  Reading  
the  diaries  by  Ye  Shaoyuan  叶绍袁  (1589-­‐‑1648),  a  Ming  loyalist  who  lived  through  the  
Qing’s   conquering   China,   he   noticed   two   different   stories.   The   first   was   of   the  
surrender  of  Suzhou   to   the  Qing   troops,  which  enabled   the  city   to  avoid   large-­‐‑scale  
massacre   (as   had   happened   in   Yangzhou   and   Jiading).   The   second   was   about   the  
Ming   loyalist   troops’   harassing   local   residents   instead   of   giving   them   aid.125  He  
argued  that  if  giving  up  one’s  political  faith  could  save  innocent  life,  it  was  the  right  
thing  to  do.  By  the  same  token,  a  political  belief  was  not  worth  defending  at  the  cost  
of  human  life.  He  repeatedly  emphasized  the  significance  of  preserving  life  at  the  cost  
of  moral   or   political   values.  Questioning   the   ideas   that   usually   put   the   nation   over  
individual   and   “righteousness”   over   people’s   life,   Zhou   inevitably   offended   the  
public  consciousness  in  the  1930s,  when  a  war  with  Japan  was  looming.    
Therefore,  although  his  critique  on  violence  did  not  have  much  social  influence,  it  
did  affect  the  formation  of  his  own  intellectual  identity.  After  Lu  Xun’s  death  he  once  
described   Lu  Xun   as   holding   a   desperately   dark   view   of   history   and   life—one   that  
amounted  to  political  nihilism.126  Such  an  observation  might  have  better  summarized  
his  own  position.  It  was  due  to  his  nihilistic  attitude  and  extreme  skepticism  that  he  
rejected  anything  passionate;127  rationality  taken  to  deranged  extremes  paved  the  way  
to   violence.   As   Bruce   B.   Lawrence   and   Aisha   Karim   point   out,   “There   is   always   a  
context,  or  a  structure,  to  violence,  and  the  reader-­‐‑observer-­‐‑participant  must  be  alert  
to   how  her   own   experience,   location,   and   options   frame   the   violence   that   seems   to  
mark   both   her   individual   and   collective   existence.”128  There   is   the   political   context  
from   which   Zhou   could   not   escape,   and   there   is   the   intellectual   context   on   which  
Zhou   relied   to   analyze   the   former.   Unlike   those  who   held   an   unexamined   view   of  
violence,  or  who  thought  it  legitimate  to  use  in  their  present  political  struggles,  Zhou  
dismissed  violence  on  humanistic  grounds.    
Zhou’s  choice  has  long  been  interpreted  negatively,  as  the  means  by  which  he  fell  
behind  his  times.129  To  him  it  was  not  that  he  fell  behind  his  times,  but  that  the  world  
in  which  he  lived  went  awry.  He  voluntarily  retreated  to  the  margins,  disassociating  
himself   from  mainstream  practices   that  were   intended   to   change   the  bloody   reality,  
but   in   fact   only   perpetuated   it.   In   early   1925,   he   borrowed   from   the   titles   of  
Kuriyagawa   Hakuson’s   Out   of   the   Ivory   Tower   and   Crossroads   to   describe   how   he  
positioned  himself  in  a  fanatical  and  violent  society:  
 
125  Zhou,  “Diaries  of  Ye  Tianliao  (1645-­‐‑1648)”  甲行日注 Collected  Essays,  vol.6,  299.  
126  Zhou,  “On  Lu  Xun”  关于鲁迅,  Collected  Essays  vol.7,  434.  
127  Shu,  Zhou  Zuoren:  His  Merits  and  Demerits,  70.  
128  Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha Karim, On Violence: A Reader (Durham: Duke University 
Press), 10.  








I  have  been  drifting  on   the   crossroads   for  a   long   time,  but   have  not  yet   joined   the  
crowd  since   cramming  among   them  made  me  uncomfortable.   It   is   also  dangerous,  
for  they  might  destroy  my  eyeglasses.  I’d  better  be  staying  in  my  attic,  yelling  at  the  
crossroads   to  vent  off  my  anger  after  drinking   two   jin  of  yellow  rice  wine.  When  I  
am  unhappy,  I  close  the  window  to  practice  calligraphy.130    
  
Imagining   an   ivory   tower   at   the   crossroads,   Zhou   introduced   an   “in-­‐‑between”  
position.   He   aimed   to   retain   both   intellectual   freedom   and   contact   with   reality  
without   the  drawbacks  of  direct  engagement:  “I  am  also   fond  of  playing  with  some  
radical  thoughts  and  provoking  the  defenders  of  the  old  morals,  as  if  I  am  searching  
for  snakes  in  the  grass.  However,  as  the  French  writer  Rabelais  says,  I  will  stop  before  
being  burnt.  Therefore,  I  am  not  necessarily  determined  to  become  a  martyr.”131  It  was  
meaningless  and  in  vain  to  engage  the  world  at  the  cost  of  one’s   life.  With  a  playful  
and  cynical  attitude,  he  would  stop  whenever  he  sensed  a  threat.  Written  in  1925,  this  
passage   revealed   how  he   conceptualized   his   relationship  with   the   social   reality.  As  
Shu   Wu   puts   it,   “coldness”   can   describe   not   only   his   aesthetic   style,   but   also   his  
attitude  towards  life.132  Therefore,  for  him,  the  best  attitude  after  the  White  Terror,  as  
he   summarized   in   1928,  was   “neither   being   obsessed  with   utilitarian   concerns,   nor  
being  totally  indifferent  to  the  world,  just  keeping  a  sober  mind.”133  He  stayed  in  his  
study  to  read  history  as  a  diversion  from  reflecting  on  reality,  and  concluded  that  his  
compatriots—with   their   absurdity,   foolishness,   and   arrogance—were   all   the  
reincarnation  of  their  ancestors’  ghosts.134    
Zhou’s   practice   can   be   viewed   as   a   form   of   cosmopolitanism135  set   against   the  
strong   nationalistic   sentiments   of   his   time.   His   “distanced   engagement”   is   best  
expressed  in  his  1929  comments  on  The  Book  of  Ecclesiastes.  He  started  the  essay  with  
an  appreciation  of  its  nihilistic  attitude:  all  the  world  is  vanity,  and  all  human  wisdom,  
pleasures   and   endeavor   turn   out   to   be   as   meaningless   as   grasping   the   wind.   But  
where   Ecclesiastes   concludes,   assuaging   the   sense   of   life’s   ultimate   vanity   through  
faith   in  God,  Zhou  offers   an   alternative   approach:   “Just   as   contemplating  on   aging,  
death,  sickness,  and  pain  in   life,  observing  the  madness  and  folly  of  people   is  also  a  
 
130  Zhou,   “A   Tower   at   the   Crossroads”  十字街头的塔,   Collected   Essays   vol.4,   76.   University  
campus  seemed  to  have  provided  him  such  a  perfect  “tower”  that  he  stayed  in  it  for  most  of  his  
time   from   late   1910s   to   1940s   in   Beijing,   where   he   mainly   taught   at   Beijing   and   Yenching  
University.  
131  Zhou,   “A  Discussion   on   Sexual  Morality  with   Friends”  与友人论性道德书,  Collected  Essays  
vol.4,  165.  
132  Shu,  Zhou  Zuoren:  His  Merits  and  Demerits,  17.  
133  Zhou,  “Liaozhai  guci  liuzhong  xu”  聊斋鼓词六种序,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  514-­‐‑5.  
134  Zhou,  “Reading  behind  Closed  Doors”  闭户读书论,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  510-­‐‑1.  
135  For  a  discussion  on  cosmopolitanism  and   its   relationship  with  modern  China,   see  Xu   Jilin,  
“May   Fourth:   A   Patriotic   Movement   of   Cosmopolitanism,”   Sungkyun   Journal   of   East   Asian  
Studies,  vol.9.1  (2009):  29-­‐‑62.  
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great  enterprise.  Positively,  it  could  be  a  work  of  significance;  negatively,  it  could  be  a  
fascinating   pastime.”136  Making   the  meaningless  wind-­‐‑grasping  meaningful  without  
resorting  to  belief   in  God  could  be  achieved  through  observing  the  world  without  a  
pragmatic   purpose.   Eliminating   purpose   from   the   world   became   the   only   rational  
choice  after  he  refused  to  change  the  world  with  bloodshed.  Grasping  the  wind  ends  
in  vanity,  but  being  aware  of  this  vanity  inspires  him  to  make  sense  of  the  process  of  
grasping.    
He  identified  himself  with  Stoics,  who  pursued  an  ascetic  life  according  to  natural  
and  rational  principles.  To  him  it  was  a  much  better  lifestyle  than  the  one  Christianity  
promised.  While  admiring  Stoicism,  he  was  also  aware  that  “it   is  doomed  to  perish,  
because  such  proposals  only  worked  for  the  few  sages.  What  the  masses  needed  was  
not   asceticism,   but   pathos,   i.e.,   joy,   desire,   worries,   and   fear,   all   of   which   are  
dismissed  by  the  Stoics.”137  He  agreed  with  Ibsen  that  “the  minority  is  always  in  the  
right,”138  positioned  himself  against  the  tyranny  of  the  majority  and  identified  himself  
with   Dr.   Stockmann,   embracing   the   identity   of   “an   enemy   of   the   people.”  Such   a  
choice  will  definitely  invite  persecutions,  such  those  that  Li  Zhi  suffered.139  Refusing  
to   join   the   games   of   violence,   it   became   his   own   choice   to   stay   away   from   the  
institutionalized  violence  and  the  chaotic  mass  movements.    
  Inevitable   as   it  was,   his   choice   left   him   lonely   and   anxious.   Because   of   this,   he  
highlighted   the   significance  of  yuan缘,   a  Buddhist   concept  usually   rendered  as   the  
predestined  bond,  affinity,  or  connection  among  people.  In  1936,  he  interpreted  yuan  
as  the  “environment”  half  of  the  “heredity  and  environment”  binary  opposition.140  In  
his   understanding,   although   human   beings   were   historically   and   existentially  
interconnected,  and  mutual  affection  could  be  possible,  such  interconnections  were  so  
well  concealed  that  people  all  lived  in  a  profound  solitude:  
 
Why do we want to establish yuan with others? It might be because people cannot 
stand living in solitude. Wealth, social rank, and male offspring are what the masses 
wanted, and for which there are places for people to pray. However, there is another 
pain that could not be relieved, which is the aforementioned solitude. Confucius 
says, ‘A person cannot flock together with the birds and the beasts. If I do not 
associate with the followers of men, then with whom would I associate?’141 Humans 
like to associate with others. However, it is in the crowd that one feels unbearably 
lonely, just as when one is packed with the waving crowds in the temple fair. Being 
cut off from everything else and existing in solitude, one’s situation is similar to that 
of a falling leaf.142 
 
136  Zhou,  “The  Great  Enterprise  of  Wind-­‐‑Chasing”  伟大的捕风,  Collected  Essays  vol.5,  568.  
137  Zhou,  “Preface  to  the  Gallery”  画廊集序,  Collected  Essays  vol.6,  541-­‐‑2.  
138  Henrik  Ibsen,  An  Enemy  of  the  People  (Whitefish:  Kessinger  Publishing,  2004),  83.  
139  Zhou,  “On  Encouraging  Others  to  Drink,”  25.  
140  Zhou,  “Beans  for  Establishing  Bond”  结缘豆,  Collected  Essays  vol.7,  359.  
141   Confucius,   and   Edward   Slingerland,   Confucius   Analects:   with   Selections   from   Traditional  
Commentaries  (Indianapolis:  Hackett  Publishing  Company,  2003),  217.  
142  Zhou,  “Beans  for  Establishing  Bond,”  360.  
 
 




Best   expressing   the   “existential   loneliness”   in   modern   China,143  Zhou   suggests   that  
such  innermost  pain  had  to  be  addressed  through  reestablishing  lost  mutual  affection.  
Thus,   to   give   one   example,   the   beans   and   cookies   seniors   used   to   build   up   ties   of  
afterlife  affection  in  Buddhist  rites  become  as  significant  as  the  bread  and  wine  in  the  
Holy  Communion.  He  bonded  with  others  in  the  imaginary  realm  of  the  page.  
            Zhou   chose   to   be   the   “enemy   of   the   people”   in   an   intellectual   sense.   Ironically,  
however,  “the  people”  perceived  him  as  their  enemy  in  a  political  sense.  From  the  late  
1920s   to   the   1930s,   he   was   gradually   came   to   be   seen   as   behind   the   times.   As   a  
renowned   liberal   intellectual, 144   he   strove   to   sustain   a   “third   space”   beyond  
antagonistic  and  politicized  spheres.  This  became  impossible  with  the  outbreak  of  the  
war   in   1937.  His   collaboration  with   the   Japanese   from   1938   left   the  Chinese  with   a  
traumatic   impression,145  and   he   was   viewed   as   a   traitor   who   disgraced   the   whole  
nation.  Even  his  artistic  achievement  during   this  period  was  seen  as   less   impressive  
when  viewed   in   the   light  of  his   earlier  writings,146  to   say  nothing  of  his  writings  on  
the  problems   in  Chinese  and  European   intellectual  history.  He  never  apologized  for  
his   treachery  even  under  harsh  criticism   in   the  new  China,   insisting   that  he  did  not  
cause   any   “actual”   damage.   Instead,   he   claimed   that   he   protected   the   property   of  
Peking   University   just   as   well   as   some   other   anti-­‐‑Japanese   activists   had.147  To   the  
public,  such  excuses  could  not  make  up  the  symbolic  loss  his  treachery  brought.148  He  
chose   to  give  up  his  name  “Zhou  Zuoren,”  which  marked  his   cultural   identity,   and  
devoted   himself   to   translating   Greek   and   Japanese   classics,   as   well   as   writing  
memoirs   and   essays   on   Lu   Xun   to  make   a   living.   During   his   lifetime   he   had   been  
terrified   by   the   idea   of   being   eaten. 149   Yet   during   the   Cultural   Revolution   he  




The  reality  was  too  violent  and  absurd  to  engage,  and  with  his  untimely  critique  
of   his   age,  Zhou  pushed  himself   to   a  point   of   no   return.   If   Lu  Xun  was  devoted   to  
 
143  Shu,  Zhou  Zuoren:  His  Merits  and  Demerits,  84.  
144  Zhang  Tierong,  On  Zhou  Zuoren周作人平议  (Tianjin:  Tianjin  renmin  chubanshe,  2006),  11.  
145  Ibid,  140.  
146  Ni,  Zhou  Zuoren  and  His  Bitter  Rain  Study,  414-­‐‑9.  
147  Shu,  Zhou  Zuoren:  His  Merits  and  Demerits,  67.   Comparing   to   Fu   Sinian’s   harsh   attitude   to  
Zhou,  Jiang  Menglin  蒋梦麟,  President  of  Beijing  University  (1930-­‐‑1944),  testified  to  the  court  to  
support   Zhou’s   self-­‐‑defense.   See   Jiang,  Western   Tide,  New  Tide  西潮   ⋅  新潮   (Changsha:   Yuelu  
shushe,  2000),  343-­‐‑4.  Zhou’s   friends  and  students,   including  Hu  Shi,  Shen   Jianshi,  also   issued  
statements  in  favor  of  Zhou.  See  Wang  Xirong,  Unresolved  Cases  in  Zhou  Zuoren’s  Life周作人生
平疑案  (Guilin:  Guangxi  shifan  daxue  chubanshe,  2005),  304.  
148  Zhang,  On  Zhou  Zuoren,  109.  
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resisting   his   despair  with   his   life,150  Zhou,   on   the   other   hand,   believed   that   despair  
was  unavoidable  for  a  rational  thinker  facing  the  inevitable  human  condition.  In  1929,  
he  cited  Blaise  Pascal  (1623-­‐‑1662)  as  having  said,  “Man  is  only  a  reed,  the  feeblest  reed  
in  nature,  but  he  is  a  thinking  reed.”  It  was  with  the  capacity  to  think  that  he  gained  
dignity  and  confidence.  Although  he  could  be  easily  crushed  by   the  colossal   fanatic  
and   violent   force   of   “the   universe,”   he   could   still   “be  more   noble   than   that   which  
slays  him.”  Because   “he  knows   that  he  dies,   and   the   advantage  which   the  universe  
has   over   him;   of   this   the   universe   knows   nothing,”151  This   passage   summarized   his  
lifelong  aim  to  attempt  “resistance  with  reason.”  
Zhou   insightfully   questioned   the   legitimacy   of   the   mainstream   Enlightenment,  
modern   political   movements,   and   the   possibility   of   national   salvation   by   defining  
them   as   inherently   irrational   and   violent.   He   considered   the   whole   Chinese  
modernization  project  cursed  by  the  unseverable  nexus  between  belief  and  violence.  
If  modernity  is  a  progressive  “disenchantment  of  the  world,” as  Max  Weber  argues,  to  
Zhou   it   soon   became   a   process   of   re-­‐‑enchantment.   In   this   sense,   there  was   nothing  
substantially   new   with   the   modern,   which   is   why   he   often   cited   the   phrase   from  
Ecclesiastes:  “there  is  nothing  new  under  the  sun.”152  Critiquing  the  newly  established  
cultural   hegemony,   his   view   of   the   Chinese   modern   shares   much   similarity   with  
Marx’s   critique   of   the   European   Enlightenment.  What   the   European   Enlightenment  
was   to   Marx,   the   Chinese   one   was   to   Zhou:   “both   an   enthralling   liberation   from  
tyranny  and  a  subtle  form  of  despotism  in  itself.”  Like  Marx,  Zhou  himself  was  also  
both  “its  firm  apologist  and  ferocious  antagonist.”153  However,  Zhou  was  not  a  Marx,  
who   preferred   changing   the   world   through   practice   to   interpreting   it   with  
philosophy154  and   who,   with   his   writings,   inspired   numerous   violent   revolutions  
worldwide.  Zhou  still  believed   that   interpreting   the  world  with  modern  knowledge  
and   rationality   was   the   basis   for   changing   it—if   that   was   even   possible—in   a  
nonviolent  manner.    
Zhou’s   disenchantment   with   the   modern   resulted   in   his   becoming   a   rational  
spectator   of   the   chaotic   world,   one   who   could   provide   a   profound   critique   on   the  
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wide  practice   of   violence,   but  who   had  no  practical   alternatives   to   offer.  Observing  
from  a  realistic  historical  perspective,  he  came  to  believe  that  all  resolute  proposals  for  
action  unavoidably  degenerated  into  appeals  to  faith  and  violence,  and  the  only  way  
to   resist   violence   was   to   reject   action.   Ray   Huang’s   comment   on   Zhou’s   favorite  
thinker  Li  Zhi  also  sheds  light  on  the  understanding  of  Zhou:  “Li'ʹs  inability  to  offer  an  
alternative   to   orthodoxy,   however,   had   little   to   do  with   his   indecisiveness.   For   the  
most   part   it   was   the   result   of   the   peculiar   character   of   the   social   order,   whose  
resistance   to   being   adapted   restricted   the   opportunity   for   innovation.”   By   the   same  
token,   the  social  order  of  Zhou’s   time  did  not   leave  much  space  for  him  to  promote  
his   individualist,   rationalist   proposals.   Huang   continues   to   explore   how   repressed  
innovative  energy  such  as  Zhou’s  can  be  re-­‐‑channeled:  “When  an  imaginative  thinker  
found   that   his   own   philosophy   had   no   relevance   to   real   life,   he  was   likely   to   turn  
toward  the  mystical  and  become  an  aesthete.”155  Although  Zhou  did  not  turn  toward  
the  mystical,  he  did  become  an  aesthete  who  significantly  contributed  to  enriching  the  
style  and  taste  of  modern  prose  writing.  Today,  Chinese  intellectuals  no  longer  need  
to  face  the  same  “either/or”  choices  between  individual  freedom  and  social  obligation.  
However,  the  various  forms  of  faith-­‐‑driven  violence,  such  as  terrorism  and  the  war  on  
terror―in  tandem  with  monstrous  neoliberal  economic  development  that  exacts  high  
human  and  ecological  costs―are  increasing.  In  an  ever-­‐‑bloodier  milieu,  the  questions  
concerning  the  “belief-­‐‑violence”  nexus  Zhou  raised  are  still  waiting  to  be  explored.  
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